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Modernization and Comparative Politics

Prospects in Research and Theory

Dankwart A. Rustow

Students of comparative politics have long been talking of institutions and groups, of political power, of parties and elites. In the last decade they have been talking more and more about political modernization. As an expression in common use among American political scientists today, "modernization" is rivaled only by its near-synonym, "political development."

Now the mere currency of this or that phrase is not in itself of great moment. American academics, as we all know from observation and introspection, are a restless and loquacious lot, and we political scientists are more restless and voluble than most. We are eager to rush after new data, to apply new techniques, to toy with new words. Our predicament is no longer that we must publish or perish: the imminent danger is that we will publish *and* perish. The munificence of foundations, the paperback revolution in the book market, the effects of affluence and high birthrates upon college enrollments, and the proliferation of professional journals all have enmeshed us in a network of communication with a truly prodigious rate of internal feedback. The accelerated currency of words is a natural by-product of this piling up of echoes. Perhaps therefore all the talk of modernization and development amounts to no more than a fashionable fad—less edifying to the senses than miniskirts, but just as ephemeral and just as distracting to serious thought.

Perhaps so, but only in part. I shall argue in the following that modernization is a concept that fits in well with some of the best and most characteristic trends in comparative politics, that research on modernization therefore must grapple with many of the unresolved problems of method and theory faced by political science in general, and that such research will yield fruitful results in proportion to our learning to solve or sidestep those problems. I should like to single out three such issues of method as they relate to modernization and comparative politics—those of scope, of locale, and of analysis of change.

Scope

The most notable trend in political science in the last generation has been our eagerness to place the study of political institutions in a broader context of social structure, cultural orientation, and psychological dynamics. For several decades now, political scientists have gone to school, literally or figuratively, with sociologists such as Weber, Parsons, and Merton, with anthropologists such as Malinowski, Benedict, and Redfield, and with psy-

chologists such as Freud, Lewin, and Erikson. The narrow emphasis on constitutional law and philosophic doctrine that still dominated our field in the 1930's and 1940's has made room for a much fuller and richer view of political behavior as conditioned by economic interest and social status, by psychological training and cultural perception.

The current preoccupation with modernization may be seen as the culmination of this trend of diversification and enrichment, a logical consequence of the transition from an institutional-legal to a behavioral-cultural approach. Modernization, according to one recent definition, denotes "rapidly widening control over nature through closer cooperation among men" and implies changes in man's attitude toward his material environment, toward his fellow man, and toward time itself.¹ It is a theme as applicable to Europe and America as to Asia and Africa, as relevant to the twentieth century as to the eighteenth and the nineteenth. By linking politics with all of technology and social organization, modernization relates the political scientist's concerns directly to those of his colleagues in sociology, anthropology, and psychology. We should remember that the dividing lines between disciplines such as these were drawn originally for the convenience of the scholar, but that they are likely to become inconvenient if too long or too jealously maintained. They provide the demarcation for a division of labor that must be periodically reconsidered. One of the principal virtues of the concept of modernization is that it can facilitate closer cooperation among existing disciplines and hence promote a rational reallocation of tasks among them.

But these potential gains also entail costs, or at least risks. One of the dangers of diversification has been loss of focus. The generation of political scientists who participated in the "successful revolt" of behaviorism against the older institutional approach has been engaged ever since in a wide search for a new basic unit of analysis.² Some have sought it in a "functional" vocabulary too abstruse to be applied in empirical research, some in the making of "decisions" that have proved difficult to isolate from the stream of reality, some in an elusive quantitative measure of power or influence, and some in messages of communication so numerous as to defy inventory. The borrowing of concepts, methods, and problems from sociology, anthropology, and psychology, instead of providing a new focus for political study, can easily make for a further blurring.

Bendix and Lipset, in a recent critique of elite studies, taxed their fellow social scientists with deducing political effect too readily from social cause. "To know who the power wielding individuals are is thought to be sufficient; it is a secondary matter to inquire into how they use their power. That they will do so in their own interest is [considered to be] self-evident, and the nature of that interest is inferred from the status which they occupy." Such

¹ Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations* (Washington, 1967), p. 3. For an earlier statement of this same concept of modernization, see C. E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (New York, 1966), Ch. 1.

² Robert A. Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest," *American Political Science Review*, LV (December 1961), 763-772.

a set of assumptions, they rightly warned, can easily lead the scholar to "explain away the very facts of political life."³

Yet elite studies have been only one example of a more general fascination with the social, economic, and psychological causes of political phenomena. This tendency has been especially pronounced in the study of modernization and political development, where scholars have sought the prerequisites of democracy in literacy, in affluence, or in consensual patterns of socialization; have traced the ambivalent attitudes of Burmese officials to crises of personal identity; have ascribed the Middle Easterner's responses to newspapers and radio programs to his capacity for empathy or his familiarity with city life; have attributed economic growth to changing methods of toilet training.⁴ Heedless, that is to say, of all that Lenin, Nkrumah, and others have preached about the primacy of politics, they have relegated politics to the position of the ever dependent variable. No one will mourn the sterile legalism of an earlier generation of political scientists; yet their successors today have been in danger of throwing the political baby out with the institutional bathwater, of letting their interdisciplinary enthusiasm carry them to the point of self-effacement as political scientists.

The denial of the primacy of politics and the attempt to explain it away accord well with the widespread acceptance of stability and equilibrium as the central ordering concepts of our social theory. A student of the sociology of knowledge might note that these tendencies have become prominent among American scholars in an era in which their country experiences unprecedented (if uneven) affluence at home and has undertaken unprecedented (if at times self-defeating) commitments to the status quo abroad.

Luckily these tendencies, though widespread, are not universal. The self-effacement of political scientists has been compensated for by the contributions that a number of economists—such as Schelling, Lindblom, Downs, and Hirschman—have made to the empirical theory of politics.⁵ And in the study of modernization, David Apter's recurrent emphasis on politics as choice, Samuel Huntington's concern with institutionalization, and Karl Deutsch's inquiry into the bases of national community have introduced a number of eminently political themes.⁶

³ Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Political Sociology," *Current Sociology*, VI, No. 3 (1957), 85.

⁴ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, 1960), pp. 45-76; Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven, 1962); Daniel Lerner et al. *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe, 1958); and Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change* (Homewood, 1962).

⁵ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960); Charles E. Lindblom, *The Intelligence of Democracy* (New York, 1965); Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York, 1957); and Albert O. Hirschman, *Journeys Toward Progress* (New York, 1963).

⁶ David E. Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago, 1965); Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 386-430, and "Political Modernization: America vs. Europe," *ibid.*, XVIII (April 1966), 378-414; Karl W. Deutsch et al. *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, 1957).

It should be clear on reflection that politics, economics, sociology, and psychology are so many different aspects of the same seamless web of social reality, and that their relation therefore must be seen as one of multiple, circular interaction. A good case, furthermore, can be made for asserting that most of man's political activities—the joining of a party, the drafting of a constitution, the seizure of power by military coup—are more deliberate than his economic pursuits, his social habits, or his psychological predispositions. Economics, in Lionel Robbins' classic definition, is concerned with the allocation of scarce means to given ends.⁷ In politics the ends are never given. Now unreflective action may be just as amenable to rational explanation; yet the study of man's deliberate choices is capable of more immediate application in practice. If the social scientist is to help illuminate the range of human choice, he must be sure to examine politics not only as effect but also as cause.

If rash borrowing from anthropology, sociology, or psychology has distracted some of our brethren from the proper study of politics, won't we be lured further afield by a study of modernization—which includes technology, economics, sociology, psychology, and much else? The danger indeed is that modernization may become, in Justice Holmes's phrase, a "brooding omnipresence"—suggestive, cloudy, and vague. What the study of political modernization these days requires above all is a set of intermediate concepts that will help bring the stratospheric omnipresence down to the tree-top level of middle-range theory, and indeed all the way down to earth in empirical research.

In a recent book, I suggested three processes that may be taken as the political elements of modernization—the growth of authority, the formation of national identity, and the quest for political equality and participation. I also discussed a fourth—political leadership—that is central to politics in a modernizing or in any other age.⁸ I should make clear at once that neither are these concepts original with me, nor are they the only transformers that can reduce the high voltage of modernization to the industrial current of political research. Other intermediate concepts have occurred, and will occur, to other scholars; and my plea for middle-range theory is quite independent of the particular concepts on which such a theory is constructed. Without, therefore, discounting any rival claims, I would invoke the following advantages for the four categories just listed:

First, authority, national identity, and equality are logically, and not just accidentally, related to modernization. It will be recalled that modernization, in the definition I cited earlier, consists of "widening control over nature through closer cooperation among men." Growing authority is the political aspect of that closer cooperation or interdependence. National identity draws the limits within which such interdependence is to be acknowledged without restriction. (As Cyril Black has proposed, modern nations are human groups that have learned to trust each other in performing the common tasks of modernization.)⁹ The degree of equality indicates the extent to which men can bring their full talents to the modern division of

⁷ *An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science* (London, 1932), p. 15.

⁸ *World of Nations*, esp. Chs. 2, 3, and 5.

⁹ *Dynamics of Modernization*, pp. 27, 75, et passim.

labor; yet the very scope and complexity of modern organization places serious obstacles in the way of equality. Robert Michels noted long ago that "organization is the weapon of the weak in their struggle with the strong," but also that the very process of complex organization introduces "oligarchic tendencies" into "modern democracy."¹⁰ Hence the dilemma of equality and organization is one of the central dilemmas of modernity itself.

Second, concepts such as authority, identity, equality, and leadership all allow us to relate politics fruitfully to other aspects of social life. A number of economic historians have investigated the interaction between the growth of governmental authority and economic development. Karl Deutsch has suggested a number of hypotheses deriving national identity from changing patterns of communication, and others have explored the ideological and psychological dimensions of nationality.¹¹ Equality relates obviously to social mobility, patterns of organization, and other standard themes of sociology. The study of leadership in turn opens up close connections of politics with psychoanalysis, with communication, with the theory of learning, and with other fields.

Third, for all their interdisciplinary potential, each of the four categories—authority, national identity, equality, and leadership—remains a political relationship. What is to be the scope of a government's decisions? To whom will they apply? Who is to participate in approving and who in formulating them? These are among the central questions of all politics. The theme of leadership, in particular, can bring together the various competing approaches that have been pursued in the behavioral study of politics. The leader as sender or recipient of messages, as creator or operator of institutions, as performer of functions, wielder of power, and maker of decisions, as cultural or psychological symbol is a figure omnipresent—but tangibly and not broodingly omnipresent—in any political process. And the study of leaders can be readily combined with that of their organizations and the mass followings whom they lead.¹²

Fourth, broad as the categories are, they are specific enough to be applied in empirical research with no more than the usual effort to render them operational. The hypotheses distilled by Deutsch and others from the process of national integration in Europe and Dahl's study of power, pluralism, and equality in an American town can serve as useful models for studies anywhere else.¹³ (I cannot offhand think of a comparable model for the study of the growth of authority, but Ernest Barker has provided a modest and sober, and Bertrand de Jouvenel an impassioned, aperçu.)¹⁴ Leadership may require further subdivision according to form of government—e.g., traditional, charismatic, military, democratic, totalitarian.

¹⁰ *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul, 1915 (New York, n. d.), p. 100.

¹¹ See the works of J. J. Spengler, S. Kuznets, and other members of the SSRC Committee on Economic Growth; Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York, 1953).

¹² This perspective is elaborated in my introduction to "Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership," *Daedalus*, XCVII (Summer 1968), 689.

¹³ Deutsch et al. *Political Community*; Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven, 1961).

¹⁴ Barker, *The Development of Public Services in Western Europe* (London, 1944); De Jouvenel, *On Power* (New York, 1949).

Locale

If the notion of political modernization accords well with our interdisciplinary impulses, it reflects at the same time a changed geographic perspective. Political scientists began to talk of modernization as in the 1950's and 1960's they turned their attention from the United States, Europe, and Russia to the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. Somewhat later they found the same perspectives to be applicable to Latin America, to China, to Russia, and even to Europe and the United States themselves. As a historic phenomenon, modernization began with a transformation of the West itself. It continued with the Western imperialist impact on the rest of the world and the non-Western response to that impact. As a concept, modernization belongs to the next phase of the same dialectic—it is a Western intellectual response to the postcolonial emancipation of the non-West. "Not long ago Western man ruled the world; today he studies it."¹⁵ The gains from this shift are readily apparent. Ours is the first generation of political scientists who have even attempted to break out of the Western parochialism of our discipline, and the concept of modernization has proved to be one of the most serviceable tools for our jailbreak.

Yet here too there are costs and dangers. Research about all of human politics anywhere on earth is as impractical as is research on modernization as such. Statements meant to apply to all societies at all times, Barrington Moore has warned, are likely to prove either trivial or false¹⁶—and much the same goes for statements about all societies embarked upon modernization. The political scientist who insists that the world is his oyster is likely to suffer a bad case of indigestion.

The risks entailed in aiming at universality too directly are well illustrated by Gabriel Almond's functional theory. Almond has been justly acclaimed as the leader of the recent revolution in the field of comparative politics because it was he who first insisted that comparison must include all major political systems—democratic, Communist, and developing—and because it was Almond and his SSRC Committee on Comparative Politics that first established political development and modernization as key themes in our discipline. Nevertheless, it seems fair to conclude from a decade's hindsight that the seven political functions that Almond selected as his chief analytic tool have not proved as fruitful for empirical research as we might have expected.¹⁷

Almond's assumption was that these seven political functions—and no more than these—were performed in all societies, though each society might perform them in different ways and through different structures. This assumption, however, can be vindicated only by turning the seven functions into definitional categories—that is, into statements not about how the real world works but about how the scholar proposes to use certain words. But to justify a new set of words or concepts, it is not enough to show that these

¹⁵ Dankwart A. Rustow, "New Horizons for Comparative Politics," *World Politics*, IX (July 1957), 530.

¹⁶ Barrington Moore, Jr. *Political Power and Social Theory* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), pp. 101f., 131.

¹⁷ Gabriel A. Almond, James S. Coleman, et al. *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, 1960); for the seven functions see Almond's Introduction, esp. pp. 26ff.; the unconscious Western bias of the scheme is most evident in Coleman's conclusion, esp. pp. 544ff.

can be applied to the full range of phenomena for which they are intended: this might be proof of no more than the author's verbal dexterity. Rather it is necessary to show that the new concepts will suggest research topics more fruitful and insights more significant than did the previous vocabulary.

It is readily apparent that Almond's "rule-making," "rule application," and "rule adjudication" are rather awkward neologisms for the executive, legislative, and judiciary. Of these several distinctions, that between rule application and rule adjudication is likely to remain meaningless in societies in which judges are not clearly distinguished from administrators, and it blurs the much more widespread distinction between civil and military functions—that is, between administrators and soldiers. On both counts it unconsciously reflects assumptions of the Western, and more particularly of the Anglo-American, political tradition since the seventeenth century. Almond laudably sent Western students of politics off to study the non-West, but regrettably he sent them off with a conceptual baggage far more distinctively Western than he realized. A less ambitious set of categories and one derived more closely from the non-Western data might well have guarded against such neoparochialism in disguise.

The role of the military in the politics of developing countries, even though it does not neatly fit into Almond's scheme, has not of course gone unnoticed. On the contrary, it has stimulated a rather extensive literature.¹⁸ This line of research starts with one notable advantage: soldiers can be far more readily identified in the real world than can abstractions such as "aggregation" or "articulation." Still, much of the literature is marred by the recurrent temptation to venture worldwide generalizations, with rather erratic results. The military thus have been pictured as the pioneers of modernization, the vanguard of a new middle class, and the champions of populism or, on the contrary, as the defenders of traditional oligarchy and the promoters of reaction. But is it reasonable to expect that Atatürk in Turkey, Stroessner in Paraguay, Chiang in China, Nkrumah in Ghana, and Perón in Argentina should all be playing similar political roles? Whereas worldwide functional abstractions have tended to be scholastic or irrelevant, worldwide generalizations about the role of the soldier in the politics of the developing countries have often been ambiguous or false. It is of course possible to formulate more accurate statements—for example, that the military in situations of political conflict command a high coercion potential. But this says no more than that soldiers are soldiers; as Moore's critique implies, the error of empirical universals is most easily corrected by triviality.

Another attempted shortcut to universal knowledge is what one might call the tally-ho method of political research: the tallying and mechanical correlation of statistical data for the countries of the globe. There are a number of shortcomings of this method that will be touched upon later. In the present geographic context, it is well to recall that the tally-ho method as commonly practiced commits the researcher to an uncritical acceptance of the present system of nation-states, real or so-called. It therefore affords

¹⁸ See, e.g., John J. Johnson, ed. *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries* (Princeton, 1962); Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago, 1964); Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (New York, 1960).

him no vantage point from which to study the formation of nation-states. It forces him to treat the "case" of Burundi, Nicaragua, or Outer Mongolia as equivalent to the "case" of the United States, China, or Brazil, and to assume that statistics for these countries are equally accurate or meaningful. And it skews all his medians and averages in the direction of Africa, where a total population just over half that of India has taken the precaution of dividing itself into two score separate states.

At the opposite extreme from these attempts to take the world in a single sweep of verbal abstraction or statistical measurement, there remains the continuing genre of the country monograph. Country studies allow the scholar to immerse himself in the full economic, social, historical, and cultural context of a single political system; in short they encourage him to expand his scope within and beyond the study of politics. Such country studies have been and remain the normal first step in the training of the student of political modernization—witness Apter's work on Ghana, Binder's on Pakistan, Coleman's on Nigeria, Weiner's on India, and a veritable flood of doctoral dissertations or published monographs since the days when these men first took to the field in the early or middle 1950's. The empirical emphasis of our graduate training is likely to ensure a continuing and perhaps growing supply of candidates eager to undertake such studies, and we may hope that the growing suspicion with which American researchers are received in many parts of Latin America, Africa, and Asia these days (as dramatized by the vicissitudes of Project Camelot) will reduce rather than cut off the flow and thereby improve our standards of training and discretion. There is no question that without the solid empirical foundation laid by such studies, past and future, no intelligent theorizing about political modernization would be possible.

Yet there are obvious drawbacks to the country study. The immersion in local materials may cast the researcher adrift far from any theoretical shore. The division of labor that such a social scientist as Marion J. Levy, Jr., appears to have had in mind—by which he would supply the global theoretical framework, apply it to one area (such as Japan), but have it applied everywhere else by his students—is based on several fallacies. First, it posits a false dichotomy between theory and empirical research which tends to condemn both to sterility; and second, it overlooks the psychological likelihood that anyone sophisticated enough to absorb one set of structural-functional concepts will also be ambitious enough to conceive his own variant set (a point vividly illustrated in the intellectual evolution of David Apter). To make matters worse, the occasional country study that does contain fruitful theoretical suggestions couched in modest and lucid language, such as Coleman's book on Nigeria or Wriggins' on Ceylon,¹⁹ is often discounted by specialists on other regions, and even by generalists, as being "merely descriptive." In a generation accustomed to trumpeting its most minute theoretical or even terminological discoveries, it seems that modesty just does not pay.

The most useful type of monographic study at this stage of evolution of our field would seem to be represented by works that do not attempt to take

¹⁹ James S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley, 1958); W. Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation* (Princeton, 1960).

in all of a political system, but rather pursue one sharply focused theme within that system. Frederick Frey's study of the changing Turkish political elite and James Payne's of labor conflict in Peru might well serve as models.²⁰ The country study, in one form or another, thus is likely to serve the continuing triple need for acquainting the student of political modernization with the difficulties of empirical research, extending our factual knowledge, and testing and elaborating middle-level theories.

On the other hand, we may hope that political scientists will more completely overcome the vestiges of the pattern of area specialization that emerged in the years after World War II. At a time when sociologists and political scientists were just beginning to escape from their parochial Western perspective, it was only logical to fill the void by relying on the previous work of archaeologists, anthropologists, philologists, and historians, whose disciplines are almost invariably divided into regional specialties. Today area programs continue to play a valuable role in training social scientists in difficult languages, such as Chinese or Arabic, and in providing them with central collections of rare library materials. But beyond this, as a source for new insights in the social sciences, area study is almost obsolete.

This may sound like a harsh judgment. Cannot an area program serve as a perfect setting for manageable comparative study? Does not the world region, as commonly defined, provide the ideal way station between the pedestrian country study and the cavalier attempt at worldwide generalization? The answer is that mere geographic proximity does not necessarily furnish the best basis of comparison. Anyone who has struggled to formulate a region-wide synopsis of the politics of the Middle East, or Southeast Asia, or Latin America, or Tropical Africa will be aware of the difficulties of generalization. What meaningful proposition applies equally to Turkey and Yemen (not to speak of Israel), to Thailand and Indonesia, to Haiti and Argentina? Each of the regions, of course, does share some aspects of culture, of history, or of geopolitics, and it becomes the author's task to make the most of such common features as he can find. In writing about the Middle East he may stress Islam, the Ottomans, and the Eastern Question; in Africa, the recent process of decolonization and such vague ideological slogans as negritude and African socialism; in Southeast Asia, the overseas Chinese or recent United States strategy; in Latin America, such timeworn clichés as *caudillismo*, *personalismo*, and oligarchy. In these and other ways, the scholar tends to become the slave rather than the master of his subject: instead of taking his own hypotheses to the locales where they may best be tested, he has to make do with the meager, ready-made generalizations that the prearranged locale will yield.

The area specialist who gives up (or refuses to enter upon) this uneven theoretical struggle can of course always take refuge in the accumulation of facts of unquestioned accuracy and of unspecified relevance. This is a strong temptation for areas where change is rapid, such as Africa, or where, in addition, the sources are difficult and scanty, such as China. Once the specialists have taken to competing in terms of factual knowledge rather than of theoretical insight (and considering that the stock of facts is rela-

²⁰ Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965); James Payne, *Labor and Politics in Peru* (New Haven, 1965).

tively small and available to all on fairly equal terms), one-upmanship comes to consist in beating your confreres to the most recent facts by securing the money for more frequent trips to the field and by cultivating better connections on arrival. There is no surer way of turning political science into a higher form of journalism.

It is no coincidence, then, that most of our major insights into modernization and related social processes originated not in centers of area study but rather in organizations with a systematic, supraregional or nonregional focus, such as the centers of international studies at Princeton, MIT, and Harvard, the Committee on New Nations at Chicago, and the SSRC Committee on Economic Growth and Committee on Comparative Politics. Moreover, only a few of our leading scholars in the field of modernization ever were members of an area institute. (Almond, Apter, Deutsch, Emerson, Huntington, and Weiner are among those who never were.) And most of those scholars, whether area institute members or not, who took up a single region, later proceeded to another (e.g., Emerson moved from Southeast Asia to Tropical Africa, Apter from Africa to Latin America, and Weiner from India to the Balkans).

A look at the range of countries treated in some of the more suggestive works on comparative political modernization and related themes (dealing with less than the world as a whole) confirms this same impression of disregard of regional divisions:

Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (1938): England, France, the United States, Russia

Simon Kuznets et al. *Economic Growth: Brazil, India, Japan* (1955)

Rushton Coulborn et al. *Feudalism in History* (1956): Europe, Japan, China, Mesopotamia, Egypt, India, Byzantium, Russia

Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (1963): Britain, Germany, Italy, the United States, Mexico

Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (1964)

Louis Hartz et al. *The Founding of New Societies* (1964): the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, Australia

Robert E. Ward and D. A. Rustow, eds. *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (1964)

Barrington Moore, Jr. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (1967): England, France, the United States, Japan, China, India

Nor does this list exhaust possible cross-regional comparisons. The student of binational problems arising from social mobilization might wish to compare Canada, Belgium, and Ceylon. The investigator who would like to carry Dahl's inquiry into the conditions of political opposition to non-Western areas might find himself comparing the Philippines, Ceylon, Turkey, Lebanon, Chile, and other countries. The scholar who would do comparative research on supranational integration might (as did Joseph Nye) start with East Africa and proceed to Central America or the West Indies. The student interested in ways of overcoming periods of entrenched militarism might compare developments in Mexico since Calles, Turkey since Atatürk, and

Spain under Franco. Note also that almost every work that tackles modernization from a global perspective suggests categories of middle-level theory that cut across conventional regions. Thus Black's concept of "defensive modernization" applies to Russia, Japan, Turkey, and other countries; Huntington's modernizing monarchies include Morocco, Ethiopia, Iran, and others; and my own interpretation of the dynamics of regimes caught in a "civilian-military twilight" was suggested by a juxtaposition of Brazil after Vargas, Argentina after Perón, and Turkey after Menderes.²¹

The virtue of selective, cross-regional comparison should be abundantly clear from this rapid survey of past and future research. Comparability is a quality that is not inherent in any given set of objects; rather it is a quality imparted to them by the observer's perspective.²² A regional selection permits the scholar to stumble along without formulating any explicit criteria of selection, any clear hypotheses. Explicitness and clarity, on the other hand, are likely to lead him to a selection of countries that cuts across the conventional regions and continents. Just as the study of modernization must descend from the level of brooding omnipresence to that of middle-level concepts, it can expect its major advances not from worldwide generalizations or from single-country studies but from explicit cross-regional comparisons.

Change

Modernization, whatever else it may be, means social change. Yet the political scientist, however bravely he may have talked of the need for "dynamic theory," has in the past been singularly ill-equipped to deal with change. A deep-seated prejudice against historical data, the complementary compulsion to be up to date, and the shortcomings of successive methods have all contributed to this unhappy result.

The limitations of the traditional institutional approach in this regard are all too obvious. If France changed from the Third to the Fourth Republic, the corresponding textbook treatment was simply updated by deleting the chapter on the one and adding a chapter on the next; if the Fourth Republic gave way to the Fifth, the same process was repeated. Just as Léon Blum and Daladier joined Dreyfus, Thiers, and Napoléon I in a perfunctory section on historical background, they were in turn joined on the textbook writer's rubbish heap by Vincent Auriol and Henri Queuille. The mechanism that might lead to the collapse of one Republic, the alternative symbols of authority that might furnish the basis for the next—these were not considered a proper part of the traditional course in foreign political institutions.

Furthermore, even though most of the major European countries were governed on a wartime emergency basis for about one out of every three years in the early twentieth century, and though each World War contributed markedly to expanding the economic and other powers of govern-

²¹ Black, *Dynamics of Modernization*, pp. 71, 121; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Political Modernization of Traditional Monarchies," *Daedalus*, XCV (Summer 1966), 763-788; and Rustow, *World of Nations*, pp. 194ff.

²² J. Bronowski, *Science and Human Values*, rev. ed. (New York, 1965), pp. 13f.: "All science is the search for unity in hidden likenesses. . . . The scientist looks for order in the appearances of nature by exploring such likenesses. For order does not display itself of itself: if it can be said to be there at all it is not there for the mere looking. . . . Order must be discovered and, in a deep sense, it must be created."

ment and to mobilizing the mass electorate, the professors in their ivory towers continued to write their texts on the assumption of perpetual peacetime normality.

Nor did some of the newer behavioral approaches bring political science closer to an understanding of change. Easton's input-output scheme, much of the group analysis of American party and pressure politics, and the structural-functional approach as taken over from anthropology and sociology were all concerned to explain equilibrium and homeostasis, which often came close to ignoring the possibility of basic change—or at least to confessing the scholar's inability to conceive of it.

The same static bias also is apparent in Almond's functional scheme. Remember that his seven functions are said to be universal and, as such, invariable. Every political system, Almond insists, has some method or other of aggregation, articulation, socialization, communication, rule-making, rule application, and rule adjudication. Quite true—if (as pointed out before) we adjust our definitions accordingly—but also quite misleading. The political functions that are in fact performed in given societies and by their governments vary vastly, and at no time more so than during modernization. Rule application—fine; but some governments are quite unable to apply the rules they make, while others manage to exact a precise obedience. Some have no adjudication worthy of the name and successfully suppress most attempts at political articulation. No amount of talk about socialization as an immemorial function of any political system will argue away the fact that, for most of the world, universal education is a rather recent political and governmental function. It is not merely that before the nineteenth century children were taught to read and write (or should I say “socialized into functional literacy”?) by different methods, or by churches or parents rather than in state schools. The truth is that most children were not taught to read or to write at all. The prodigious expansion of governmental functions, in education, conscription, taxation, economic regulation, social welfare, information, propaganda, and so forth, clearly is one of the most striking and significant aspects of political modernization.

There is a similar limitation on what I earlier called the tally-ho method of political research. Correlations between contemporary social, economic, and political indicators for series of countries give no clues whatever as to the direction, if any, of causality. If authors such as Lipset or Cutright find democracy highly correlated with education, affluence, and urbanization (and if for the moment we stipulate the adequacy of their data), we still do not know (1) whether college graduates, rich people, and townsmen make better democrats or (2) whether democracy is a system of government that encourages schooling, wealth, and urban residence or (3) whether both democracy and its alleged correlates result from further unexplored causes.²³

Nor can the weakness of this method of contemporary correlation be removed by simply multiplying the indices to be tallied. Karl Deutsch some years ago proposed the collection of 95 political-statistical indicators for the 130 or so countries of the globe—a challenging task indeed of fact-

²³ Lipset, *Political Man*; Phillips Cutright, “National Political Development,” in Nelson W. Polsby et al., eds. *Politics and Social Life* (Boston, 1963), pp. 569-582.

gathering and standardization of information. An imaginative and sophisticated scholar himself, he repeatedly stressed that "quantitative data can aid the judgment of the political analyst, but cannot replace it."²⁴ But lesser scholars have often ignored such caveats and have instead been tempted to feed the resulting 12,350 sets of data into some giant computer in the naïve expectation that it would produce their hypotheses for them.²⁵ The observation of a leading historian and philosopher of science here seems particularly apt. "Does anyone think," exclaims Bronowski, "that such a law [as Kepler's] is found by taking enough readings and then squaring and cubing everything in sight? If he does then, as a scientist, he is doomed to a wasted life; he has as little prospect of making a scientific discovery as an electronic brain has."²⁶

Luckily, less wasteful methods of hypothesizing about change have been found. Indeed, one of the best collections of such hypotheses is the model of political integration and disintegration presented by Deutsch himself in *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*. Significantly, the work does not contain a single statistical table; instead it draws on the wealth of available historical data about national integration in Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and other countries. In gathering quantitative and statistical data, too, there is a new tendency to look for historical time series—e.g., Rokkan's work on election participation and the project currently being undertaken by William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman at the University of Minnesota. The more marked historical emphasis in the most recent works of leading sociologists and political scientists such as Almond, Bendix, Dahl, Lipset, and Barrington Moore also is striking and unmistakable.²⁷ The notion of political culture, in particular, introduced by scholars such as Samuel Beer and Gabriel Almond, just because of its vague and residual nature, has made possible the consideration not only of current psychological attitudes but also of collective behavior traits shaped in the course of history.²⁸

In the study of political modernization itself, much remains to be done to establish a more refined and sophisticated theoretical perspective. The concept itself harks back to a number of dichotomies developed by nineteenth-century sociologists—such as that between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, or between patrimonialism and bureaucracy.²⁹ The next logical step was to transform dichotomy into a continuum—a task undertaken, for example, in W. W. Rostow's widely quoted book *The Stages of Economic Growth*.³⁰ Yet the resulting unilinear view of evolution is still somewhat

²⁴ "Toward an Inventory of Basic Trends and Patterns in Comparative and International Politics," *American Political Science Review*, LIV (March 1960), 46.

²⁵ See, for example, Arthur S. Banks and Robert S. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).

²⁶ *Science and Human Values*, p. 11.

²⁷ See Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston, 1966); Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-building and Citizenship* (New York, 1964); Robert A. Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States* (Chicago, 1967); Seymour Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation* (New York, 1963); Barrington Moore, Jr. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston, 1966).

²⁸ Samuel H. Beer and Adam Ulam, eds. *Patterns of Government* (New York, 1962); Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, 1963).

²⁹ For a good summary of such dichotomies, see Pye, *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building*, pp. 33ff.

³⁰ Cambridge, 1960.

primitive. As I have written elsewhere, "It is as if Darwin had expected the amoeba, in five successive stages of growth, to evolve into a fern, an elephant, a sequoia, and a dinosaur."³¹ Along with its simplicity went a certain naïve optimism—one that Rostow himself has retained even as he left his professorship at MIT to spend the Vietnam years in the State Department and on the White House staff.

A second welcome modification was the recognition by Huntington, Eisenstadt, and other writers that where there can be development there can also be decay.³² Such a dual scheme does not prejudice the outcome of any given historical process and does force the observer to specify carefully his criteria of evaluation. A third modification is implicit in the recognition by other authors that modernization is a process involving a large array of changes and that the sequence or simultaneity of such changes makes for considerable variations in basic patterns.³³

No doubt further modifications will suggest themselves as the study of modernization is pursued, both in detail and in broad comparative conspectus. For those eager to arrive at quantitative correlations, in particular, it will be well to take to heart Hayward Alker's recent reminder that not all correlations are linear.³⁴ Myrdal's notion of the spiral, Deutsch's suggestion of the possibility of a "quorum of prerequisites," and the recent use that Neubauer has made of the "threshold" concept suggest a few (still rather simple) departures from the (oversimple) linear model.³⁵

The richer historical perspective that political scientists are coming to adopt is likely to heighten their sensitivity and sophistication and to increase their immunity to the temptations of up-to-the-minute journalism or of verbal scholasticism. By multiplying the number of empirical examples available for generalization (including examples of change over time), the historical perspective can vastly extend the usefulness of the comparative laboratory. But in this connection it is well to remember that history should not exclusively, indeed should only within strict limits, be used as a storehouse for discrete empirical cases. In modernization, for example, it makes a profound difference whether a country was among the pioneers of the process (as the European countries were in the early modern age) or whether it is among the latecomers that are trying to catch up. The Revolution of 1917 may have had much in common with those of 1640 or 1789, but there was this crucial difference: Lenin knew about Cromwell and Robespierre, but not they about him. History becomes possible—and its study necessary—because man is in some measure conscious of his past, and this consciousness sets certain limits on the behaviorist's ambition to deduce general laws from the accumulation of discrete examples of such human actions as can be externally observed.

³¹ *World of Nations*, p. 141.

³² Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay"; see also his forthcoming *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, 1968); S. N. Eisenstadt, "Breakdowns of Modernization," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XII (July 1964), 345-367.

³³ Black, *Dynamics of Modernization*; Rostow, *World of Nations*.

³⁴ "The Long Road to International Relations Theory: Problems of Statistical Non-additivity," *World Politics*, XVIII (July 1966), 623-656.

³⁵ Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma* (New York, 1944), methodological Appendix; Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, LXI (December 1967), 1002-1009.

Aside from the refinement of evolutionary models and the more sophisticated use of historical data, is it not time to introduce some notion of change into our very conception of politics itself?

This is not the place for more than a few hints about such a conception of politics itself as a process of change. It seems to me that one large class of political acts is commonly undertaken for the very purpose of changing parts of the social world: a new political party is formed to wrest power away from those who now exercise it, a new alliance is concluded to reverse the present balance of power, a pressure group swings into action to change a given piece of legislation. A second class of changes occurs as the result of such political action. For example, a party or action group will change its character whether it attains its original purpose or whether it fails—for the simple reason that whatever has been achieved no longer needs to be striven for and an impossible aim at length becomes an empty incantation. Thus the Anti-Saloon League peters out after the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, and the postwar Communist parties in France and Italy, after two decades of mouthing revolutionary slogans, find themselves integral parts of a bourgeois order.

A third type of political change results from the distinct (indeed, often the opposite) conditions necessary for the birth and for the survival of a given type of regime. For example, postcolonial states originate in militant anticolonial nationalism but survive through careful management of their economic and foreign policy problems. Military regimes typically result from secret plotting and armed revolt but endure as they obtain a wider basis of support in alliance with civilian bureaucrats or a political party. Charismatic leaders, according to Weber, establish their credentials by performing seeming miracles but preserve their legitimacy through routinization and bureaucratization. An absolute monarchy is best sustained by unquestioned acceptance of tradition and heredity but evidently cannot be newly founded on the same principle. Democracy arises through conflict and compromise but survives by virtue of growing consensus. Communist regimes have been installed by revolutionary elites or conquest from abroad but consolidated through the growth of a domestic mass party and its bureaucracy. The change of political imperatives in the career of individual leaders is quite as drastic as that in the regimes over which they come to preside—as any reflection on the preconvention, preelection, and postinauguration tactics of an American President will illustrate.

If there is any merit in considerations such as these, it will no longer be necessary to engraft an evolutionary theory of modernization on a static or equilibrium view of politics. Rather, the study of modernization as macropolitical change would grow organically out of the study of the rise, transformation, and fall of political groups, institutions, and leadership as processes of micropolitical change.