This is a tentative outline of a systematic and comprehensive approach to the study of politics. Part I gives the method. Part II indicates some advantages of the approach. Part III anticipates likely objections to it. And Part IV suggests some applications. My purpose in presenting the paper in its present form is to encourage my colleagues to consider this approach and, if they find it potentially useful, to contribute to its refinement through criticism. As David Easton said in his “Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems,” I know “I run the definite risk that the meaning and implications of this point of view may be only superficially communicated; but it is a risk I shall have to undertake since I do not know how to avoid it sensibly.”

I

Politics is the process by which a community deals with its problems. A community exists among people who are aware of pursuing common goals. Problems are obstacles perceived on the road toward goals. Problems must therefore be recognized in order to become politically relevant or alive. But recognition of a problem by itself does not lead to the generation of politics about it. When there is complete consensus in the community on the solution of a problem, after it has been recognized, no politics concerning the problem takes place. In this sense, a community whose members always agree on solutions to their problems is not a political system. Since there are few (if any) such communities, most communities are political systems. In almost all communities, disagreements occur. Disagreements present issues. A political system, therefore, is a community that is processing its issues. While the basic prerequisite for community is consensus, though minimally only on common goals (which may be negative, like prevention of the extermination of the community of mankind), the basic prerequisite for a political system is dissensus. Politics arises out of disagreements within a network, wide or narrow, loose or tight, of agreement. (17–27)

A problem enters politics once members of the community recognize it and disagree about it. A problem leaves politics when it has been “solved” and this solution has been recognized. Between the beginning and end of this process, the issue(s) generated by a problem passes through four phases of the “flow of policy”: (1) formulation of the issue, (2) deliberation, (3) resolution, and (4) solution of the problem. Since problems are obstacles on the road to goals, disagreements may be about the substance of the goals or the procedures used to approach them. (363–372) In either case, the issue may be perceived as involving a long-term, fundamental matter or a short-term, circumstantial matter. (211–213)

A political system may be described, and two or more systems may be compared, by “plotting” the incidence of issues with reference to two intersecting axes. The vertical axis runs from the procedural to the substantive extreme, the horizontal from the fundamental to the circumstantial. (Figure 1)

In every political system, some issues arise under each of the four combinations. (I) Fundamental procedural issues are generated by problems arising out of the goal of stability, i.e., by constitutional problems. (II) Procedural circumstantial issues are generated by problems arising out of the goal of flexibility, i.e., typically by economic problems in modern or modernizing communities. (III) Circumstantial substantive issues are generated by problems arising out of the goal of efficiency, i.e., by power problems. (IV) And substantive fundamental issues are generated by problems arising out of the goal of effectiveness, i.e., by cultural problems.

1 I am already indebted for very helpful critiques to V. O. Key, Jr., Harvey C. Mansfield, Franklin L. Ford, Harry Eckstein, and especially Duncan MacRae, Jr.
2 World Politics, Vol. 9 (April 1957).
3 This does not imply a “progressive” as distinguished from a “conservative” bias, since the goals may include maintenance of the status quo.

4 Numbers in parentheses refer to pages in my Government by Constitution: The Political Systems of Democracy (New York, 1959), where the concepts used in this paper were put to work in a less systematic fashion, and which contains many concrete illustrations that could not be included here.

5 This distinction is not meant to suggest that issues about fundamentals are more important than those about circumstantial.
The relative success of political systems (or of one system at different times) can be gauged by the degree to which they manage to sustain a dynamic equilibrium among the four basic goals. (41–42) If problems are thought of as the input and solutions the output of the political system, efficiency measures the output-input ratio. If the system solves none of its problems, it will fail. But the problems it recognizes for processing, the process itself, and the solutions also have to be considered effective, or acceptable, by at least those members whose opposition could put an end to the system. At least some procedures used for the handling of problems have to remain stable over time, otherwise the system will lose its identity vis-à-vis itself and its basic goals.6 But both procedures and even more the policies (or solutions) worked out within these procedures have to be sufficiently flexible to adjust to changes in the content of the community’s problems; otherwise stagnation will set in.

Stability and effectiveness are concerned with the long run; flexibility and efficiency with the short run. Each of these basic goals needs to be balanced by its temporal opposite. Stability and flexibility are concerned with the methods used for handling issues; effectiveness and efficiency with the content of problems and their solutions. Each procedural goal should be balanced by its substantive opposite.

None of the four basic goals by itself is sufficient for the success of a political system. Exclusive concern with stability is shown by legalistic attempts to foreorder the entire future by means of comprehensive, detailed, and consistent regulation. (211–236) This is designed to preclude the need for any future choices, to prevent changes in values or goals, and to keep efficiency at its current level, since no novel substantive problems will be allowed to come up. The final goal pursued here is a kind of regimented bureaucratism. Members of a more or less well balanced political system who are overly committed to bringing about stability only will raise a disproportionate number of issues under (I). Their political style is legalistic. The style of the subsystem of these members could be described graphically as in Figure 2.

Exclusive concern with flexibility is the temporal antithesis of legalism. (182, 189)
Here the desire is to keep opportunities for change permanently open. Constancy in goals would consequently become impossible, and policies would fail because of inability to sustain them long enough to solve the problems to which they were addressed. Even the procedures of politics would be altered in response to changes in the problems currently considered most pressing. Anarchy would be the logical end result. Members overly interested in flexibility will raise a disproportionate number of issues under (II). Their style is pragmatic. (Figure 3)

Exclusive concern with efficiency results from the desire to achieve nothing but the immediate solution of current problems. (179–180, 186–187) It manifests itself in technocratic focussing on the substance of problems, as these happen to be perceived at the moment, in order to bring available power and other resources to bear on them at once. What participants desire is quick solutions—regardless of the means used, of alternative policies that may have been suggested, or of the effectiveness of these solutions in terms of goals other than pure short-run efficiency. The end result of imposition of its rule by an efficiency-minded group would be a kind of technocratic totalitarianism. Such persons will raise a disproportionate number of issues under (III). Since they are concerned only with the application of power to the solution of problems, their political style in its extreme form is violent. (Figure 4)

Exclusive concern with effectiveness is the temporal opposite of violence. (194–210) It would seek to imprison the whole community in the rubrics of one ruling ideology. Ideological motivation would shape the recognition of problems and the formulation of issues, regardless of “objective” needs. All policy is put in the service of the long-run substantive goals to which the ideology is committed, so that nothing that deviates from it can remain stable, nor can adjustments be made to changes within, or in the environment of, the system, unless the ideology itself dictates these changes. Theocracy or “hierocracy,” in which a fanatical intelligentsia, secular or spiritual, ruled would be the result of victory by a group committed to the exclusive pursuit of effectiveness. Members of a more or less balanced political system who have this kind of commitment will raise an inordinate number of issues under (IV). Their style is ideological. (Figure 5)

The style of a successful political system, in which tensions due to pursuit of the four basic goals bring about a dynamic equilibrium, could be described by Figure 6. It also relates the political process, i.e., the four phases of the flow of policy, to basic goals and to types of issues and problems. A system is most successful when issues cluster around the intersection of the procedural-substantive and fundamental-circumstantial axes. This central clustering will happen, not because of the content of the problems dealt with, but because of the equilibrium described above. This in turn is related to the particular sequence in which each of the four phases of the political process proceeds from one to another of the basic goals.

A problem is recognized for issue formulation when fundamental substantive goals, i.e., the effectiveness of the system and its policies, call for its solution. Cultural values, in the broad sense, lead to recognition of discrepancies between goals and current conditions. But the
particular formulation that the issue receives is shaped by the fundamental procedures in use. If there is disagreement on recognition of the problem and/or its proper solution, this is due to differences in the fundamental substantive goals of members. But the form in which the resultant issue is stated—two or three alternative solutions, clear or vague differentiation, etc.—is shaped by the "constitution," and the fact that it is so shaped gives, and is usually designed to give, stability to the system, regardless of the content of all the various issues that have to be dealt with. (164-177)

Deliberation consists of the consideration of alternative solutions to a problem. The alternatives, having already been formulated, are now examined in the light of the need to adjust to changes inside the system and in its environment. (239-257) Without realistic consideration of these changes, deliberation would be meaningless, and the solution would be unsatisfactory.

Deliberation normally leads to resolution, that is, the narrowing down of alternatives and the final selection of one policy. Resolution might be called "the big decision," since the word decide means to cut off—in this case, to cut off deliberation. (258-269) But one should not identify resolution alone with decision, because the whole political process consists of a sequence of decisions: what problems to recognize, how to formulate the issues, how to deliberate and resolve, what resources to use in solution, and many more decisions. While the formulation of the issue involves fundamentals, its resolution involves short-term considerations. Resolution is always addressed to the problem as it appears at the moment deliberation is cut off. It need therefore not be final, because changes can always be made during the phase of solution. In fact, resolution rarely is final, and only rigid adherents of the mechanical doctrine of the separation of powers believe that the legislature deliberates and resolves, and then the executive puts this resolution into effect. (12-13) Actually, "the executive," and whoever else participates in the final phase of the political process, often introduces new, or re-introduces old, alternative solutions to the problem. In any case, the resolution of the deliberated issue directs flexibility toward efficiency. While constitutional and economic considerations normally play important roles in the course of deliberation, economic and power considerations do so during resolution. And while an excess of constitutional regulation may prevent an optimal weighing of alternatives, a lack of available power or other re-
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sources may lead to inability to arrive at resolution of the issue.

The phase of solution deals with the substance of a problem, bringing to bear short-run power for the achievement of the community's long-run goals. Solution of a problem normally removes the goal on the road toward which the problem was an obstacle. Once an economy with millions of unemployed has achieved stable full employment, this achievement ceases to be a goal, though the maintenance of full employment may continue as a goal of lesser importance. In a successful system, solution links efficiency to effectiveness and thereby clears the channels of politics for the recognition and processing of new problems that are obstacles on the road to new goals.

Formulation, deliberation, resolution, and solution are called phases rather than stages or departments of the political process or, preferably, of the flow of policy, in order to emphasize that they usually overlap. In an emergency, for example, all four may be compressed into a matter of moments. (269-273) Moreover, political systems differ with respect to the relative importance of the four phases and the basic goals that are given strongest consideration in each phase. For example, a system with a very legalistic style might devote most of its politics to the concoction of "artificial" constitutional issues and their very abstract deliberation, without ever arriving at their resolution or the solution of its "real" problems. Or a system of very violent style might concentrate its politics on the quick resolution of conflicts between various armed organizations and the efficient solution of these problems, to the complete neglect of considering alternative solutions and formulating other issues about different problems. In the Fourth Republic, French politics was preoccupied with formulation and deliberation, to the neglect of resolution and solution. In the Fifth Republic, this emphasis has been reversed.

The style of a political system at any one time is rarely as one-sided as in the preceding examples of legalism and violence. Combinations with a double or triple emphasis are more common; for example, legalistic pragmatism, as often displayed in American constitutional litigation (Figure 7); pragmatic violence, as among the criminal underworld (Figure 8); ideological legalism, as in Calvin's Geneva; or alternating pragmatic and ideological violence, as in the Soviet Union (Figure 9). A triple emphasis of this kind cannot describe the style of a system at one moment, because ideologism and pragmatism are true opposites, as are legalism and violence. Triple emphasis is therefore more likely to describe style over time, when radical oscillations occur, e.g., from ideologically motivated to pragmatically motivated violence. However, simultaneous concern with stability and efficiency, or with flexibility and effectiveness, is possible when the issues of politics are clustered around the intersection of the two axes: for example, when the problem is jay-walking and the issue is means of enforcement, arguments about legality (not legalistic arguments) and the availability of traffic cops can be adduced simultaneously without calling for a description of style as violently legalistic. Or when the issue arises out of the problem of dowries in a modernizing community, arguments about cultural values and the distribution of income may be raised in the course of pushing this problem closer toward solution, without making the style ideologically pragmatic.

The greater the incidence of issues away from the central intersection, the weaker is consensus on those of the basic goals near which the issues cluster, and the more pathological is the
style in that particular direction. For example, when the most important issues revolve around the constitutional document itself—constant proposals for its amendment, discussions of its internal consistency, of its effectiveness, of its adequacy to solve the problems different members consider most pressing—if indeed this preoccupation with the constitution leads to the formulation of artificial issues, then consensus is obviously weakest on the content of the goal of stability, and style is legalistic.

For most subsystems, this kind of preoccupation with only one or two of the four basic goals is normal. The judiciary, for example, and parts of the bureaucracy are subsystems more concerned with stability than with anything else. (276–297) Both the internal style of these subsystems and their contributions to the style of the system of which they are parts will tend more toward legalism than toward the other three styles. However, a detail of their square, Figure 6 (I), shows that their concern with stability also has aspects of flexibility, efficiency, and effectiveness; and that, while the two phases of the central policy flow to which they mainly contribute—formulation and deliberation—deal typically with the constitutional aspects of problems, these constitutional aspects have to be looked at from the “purely” constitutional, the constitutional-economic, the constitutional-power, and the constitutional-cultural points of view. (Figure 10)

Similar details for the other squares would show major preoccupation with flexibility on the part of, say, a business firm during a period of great economic growth, Figure 10 (II), with efficiency on the part of, say, the military in some Latin American country, Figure 6 (III), and with effectiveness on the part of, say, “ideologues,” propagandists, or public relations agents of a certain type, Figure 6 (IV).

Useful comparisons can be made by examining the internal political style of similar subsystems or groups of political personnel in different systems; e.g., the governments of Paris and Stockholm, Coca Cola distributors in various countries, the general staff corps of France and Germany, or of Weimar and Federal Germany, different firms in the American electrical industry, or the top newspapers of several states. This kind of comparison would show, among other things, that the sources of authority of the personnel of these subsystems vary from one system to the next, and do so even more within any single political system. If authority is considered a kind of “additive” to central decisions, which leads those who are exposed to the consequences of these decisions to accept them, then the sources of authority can be classified in the same way as issues and consensus. (372–379) For instance, military heroes have authority among the military as a result of substantive circumstantial achievements, like a general’s victories. Some saints have authority among communicants of their religion as a result of more fundamental substantive claims, such as visions of the deity, performance of miracles, or stigmata. The

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**Figure 10. Judicial and business firm systems.**

[Diagram of the four subsystems: Procedural, Substantive, Fundamental, Circumstantial]
Supreme Court of the United States enjoys authority among the legal profession and other Americans because it is identified with the fundamental procedures of the legal profession and of the Constitution. (282-286) Medical researchers like Dr. Jonas Salk enjoy authority among the public because they have addressed their innovating methods to the successful solution of current medical problems. I am willing to take the prescriptions my general practitioner issues to me and I regard him as an authority on my ills, because he has solved my medical problems before and because I know him to have been certified by meeting a combination of procedural and substantive requirements.

These are examples of authority in various types of subsystems. Of greater interest are the sources of authority of contributors to the central flow of policy. In a successful system, these sources vary with the phase(s) of the political process in which particular contributors are chiefly involved. To illustrate this, we can take the American problem of the costs of medical care. In Figure 11, each of the four phases of the policy flow is further broken down into two sub-phases, one on either side of the axis passing through it. The recognized problem is brought to public attention and (1) formulated as a substantive issue by leaders of affected interest groups, that is, subcommunities whose members are aware (or are being made aware) of having special goals and problems in common. Among these are leaders of underprivileged minority groups, of labor unions, of the medical profession. The issue is then (2) formulated in such a form that it can be deliberated upon, given the constitution of the system, in this case the fundamental procedures of politics in the United States. In this phase, legal advisers to the groups involved make their contributions, and other lawyers and the courts may also participate, e.g., if constitutional test cases are initiated. Some of the issues arising out of the general problem are formulated by the political parties, e.g., through inclusion of planks in their platforms, and by other national politicians through introduction of legislation, e.g., to change social security laws. These issues are (3) deliberated upon in the Congress and, occasionally, by Congressional politicians, the President, and others outside the Congress, e.g., in public debates and on television interviews. Next, (4) deliberation begins to be carried on by increasingly less “constitutional,” more interest-oriented figures, like negotiating agents for the various groups involved, perhaps with the advice of economists and business consultants. The issue will come closer to (5) resolution, perhaps after further litigation, as a result of successful negotiation between the antagonists, or through Congressional action. In Switzerland, a referendum might bring resolution at this point. (6) Substantive resolution can also be accomplished through threats or the use of force, as in strikes or violent clashes between doctors’ and patients’ organizations and the police. Here men whose authority comes largely from substantive and circumstantial sources would be in charge. After resolution of the issue, (7) solution begins with participation of government and private administrators, like the Surgeon General, hospital administrators, Blue Cross officials, Social Security civil servants. Finally, (8) the original problem is solved and thereby removed close to the “low” or “grassroots” levels at which it was first recognized through the actions of doctors and patients and subordinate bureaucrats who operate the system that has been set up more or less in keeping with the resolution of the issue. The authority of these people is derived from their identification (which may be a new product of the earlier phases of the process) with the substantive fundamentals of the community.

In an unbalanced system, on the other hand, sources of authority will be out of keeping with the particular phase of the policy flow to which participants contribute. For example, in subphase 3 of deliberation, which calls for authority coming from identification with fundamental procedures, practicing physicians and “experienced patients” may be the main actors. Or in subphase 7 of solution, which calls for authority based on experience with administrative and medical organization, the bargaining agents of medical associations or labor unions may play the most important role. In either case, the success of the system in its handling of this problem would suffer. The mishap in subphase 3 might be an indication of ideological style. The malfunction in subphase 7 would

![Figure 11. Sub phases in the policy flow.](image)
suggest pragmatic style. If mob leaders or the police had to get involved in subphase 2 of formulation, this would be a manifestation of violent style. If constitutional lawyers opened new issues in the course of subphase 7 of solution, the system would be suffering from undue legalism.

Perfect equilibrium among the four basic goals is hard if not impossible to achieve and it would not be desirable to insure success except under very rare conditions. Members of any non-stagnant political system change their estimates of the most important problems it faces. If they start, for example, by considering solution of the problem of independence from outside rule most important, as colonial independence movements have, the initial style of the system may be more or less violently ideological. Once independence is achieved, leaders identified with solution of the problem of colonialism will be regarded as most authoritative in all phases of the political process. If the independence movement develops successfully into a new political system, its style will add elements of pragmatism and legalism, as concern shifts to flexibility and stability, the original problem having been solved efficiently and effectively, i.e., in an acceptable fashion. In this kind of development, the phase of deliberation would be last to receive the backing of a firm consensus. (Figure 12) Consensus would initially be strongest on solution to the poorly formulated, undeliberated, and therefore technically “non-resolved” independence problem. But this would be true only within the movement, since between it and the colonial power this would be precisely the area of greatest disagreement, leading to ideologism and violence in the larger system and, eventually, to its breaking apart.

On the other hand, a subsystem that starts off with an exclusive pursuit of stability, perhaps out of opposition to an efficiency-oriented totalitarianism, (1) will have an initially legalistic style; (2) slowly pay greater attention to the twin needs of flexibility and effectiveness; and (3) finally perhaps reach a point where it is ready to use violence against the totalitarian regime to solve its own crucial problem. The German resistance to Hitler seems to have followed this pattern. (Figure 13) Its members began by discussing the legality of resistance to the tyrant (and drafted a new constitution for the Reich), then constructed an ideology of resistance on this foundation of constitutionality, considered how to adjust their tactical plans to Hitler's operating procedures, and finally—after several unsuccessful
attempts on his life—set off the bomb in his headquarters on July 20, 1944.

After failure of this plot, the Nazi regime's reactions followed the reverse order, though this development occurred much more quickly. The first reaction (1) was brutally violent. It then became somewhat more pragmatic in the sense that temporary concessions were made where this seemed expedient, e.g., concerning executions. At the same time, (2) the existing anti-resistance ideology was quickly elaborated. Finally, (3) the surviving major conspirators were tried by a special people's court, so that their execution could be presented as "legal" to the public. A diagrammatic presentation would look like Figure 13, except that the movement starts in (III), not (I), and that final arrows from (III) to (I) would be much farther away from the central intersection. (Figure 14)

This comparison of the resistance to Hitler and its repression by the Nazis might suggest that the development patterns of these two or any political (sub)systems are considered of equal value or, indeed, that this method of comparison pretended to be wertfrei. It does not, for two related reasons. In the first place, the purpose of comparison is to evaluate the relative success of political systems, success having been defined as a dynamic equilibrium among the four basic goals. Success was not defined with reference to the achievement of the always necessarily transient substantive goals of political systems. However, this criterion of success may be considered unsatisfactory because, for example, we might at least conceive of an ideologically violent totalitarianism that manages to indoctrinate its population so thoroughly in its ideology that it retains sufficient stability and flexibility to remain effective. No totalitarianism has in fact so far "succeeded" in this sense. On the contrary, the more successful ones are precisely those that moved away from an exclusively substantive to an increasingly procedural emphasis in both consensus and sources of authority. This objection is, nevertheless, well taken, and the normative assumptions underlying this approach can be made explicit. (30–42)

In the first instance, or in the last instance, or in both, it is individual human beings who recognize the problems that make up the raw material of politics, because these human beings are working toward goals: in the first instance, when individuals deliberately come together, as in modern interest organizations; in the last, when collectivism is at least alleged to serve the end goal of greater individualism, as according to Marx ("the free development of each . . . "). Human beings are distinguished from the rest of creation (or "existence") by their presumed capacity to work deliberately toward perceived goals. What distinguishes them even more is their capacity to invent new goals, e.g., when old ones have been reached. In this respect, human beings, or our understanding of ourselves, resemble political systems (more than our understanding of political systems resembles our understanding of human beings, since the differentiated functioning of political systems is much more open to analysis than that of individual persons). (28–29)

The individual, as a personality system, also pursues the basic goals of stability, flexibility, efficiency, and effectiveness, in terms of his own built-in or acquired substantive values. He or she also has to maintain a dynamic balance in the pursuit of these basic goals. The development of the behavior style of infants or older persons could be described in the terms used here for political systems. (366–367) Because there is general agreement that human beings are capable of forging new goals for themselves and of working toward their goals, broad consensus might also be reached on the desirability of providing individuals with optimum opportunities for "realizing themselves" in this sense. The norm of individual responsibility could serve as the highest common normative denominator for the two antagonistic camps of the Cold War, and others, at least philosophically. This norm demands that individuals should be given opportunities to contribute to those central decisions whose consequences will affect themselves; and that their capacity to contribute to such decisions should be proportionate to the extent of their exposure to the consequences. The balance between opportunity to contribute and exposure to consequences describes the individual's situation of responsibility. To be in a sound situation of responsibility, one should be provided by the political system with four ingredients: (1) foreknowledge of the probable consequences of one's decisions; (2) choice among alternative courses of action; (3) resources with which to realize the choice; and (4) purpose or commitment on the part of the system to the norm of responsibility itself.8


8 For an earlier application of the norm of responsibility, see my "Co-Determination in Germany," this REVIEW, Vol. 48 (December 1954), pp. 1114–1127. "Purpose" has been added as a fourth ingredient since then, for reasons that may be apparent.
Without foreknowledge, one's situation in the political system would lack stability; without choice, it would lack flexibility. Without resources, the problems arising out of one's membership could not be dealt with efficiently; and without the system's commitment to the goal of responsibility, its pursuit by the individual would be thwarted even if the other three ingredients are provided. Knowledge and choice are matters of procedure; resources and purpose are matters of substance. Foreknowledge and purpose relate to fundamental goals, choice and resources to circumstantial problems. (Figure 15) The pathological systems described by Figures 2 to 5 and 7 to 9 would, each in a different way, unbalance their members' capacity to pursue self-realization, that is, to achieve a sound situation of responsibility, by putting one or more of its four ingredients beyond their reach. For this reason, disequilibrium and pathological style can also be criticized systematically from a normative standpoint.

Table 1 shows relations between various dimensions of this approach. The approach makes possible systematic comparison by allowing the same aspects of any two or more political systems, empirical or normative, to be "plotted" in systematic comparison to one another. Issues are taken as the basic data of politics. Their incidence can be plotted comparatively with reference to the two coordinates, Substantive-Procedural and Fundamental-Circumstantial. These in turn are related to the basic goals of any system, balance between which serves as a criterion of success and, at the level of the individual, of normative judgment. Political style and sources of authority can each be described systematically and in relation to one another. Style and authority can also be related systematically to the political process and the personnel of politics. (276-297) The approach also offers a tool for the comparative study of political development of systems and subsystems, in relation to their problems, issues, consensus, sources of authority, types of personnel, and the political process. It also provides a descriptive pathology of politics. So far, systematic description is the main use of this approach. Without systematic description, comparison is difficult. Without sound comparisons, explanations are impossible.

While systematic comparison is its main advantage, the method may also have some other merits. Among these is avoidance of any artificial compartmentalization of one and the same system into "polity," "society," "economy," "culture," etc. To be sure, any system studied by political scientists has all these

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aspects, and sociologists, economists, anthropologists, and other "social" scientists have developed their own methods for studying these aspects. The approach outlined here would rely heavily upon application of these methods. For example, when we want to compare the efficiency of two systems, we would turn to economics, which is better qualified than any other "policy science" to relate output to input. Sociologists would be best qualified to study, among other things, consensus, especially cultural. The several component disciplines of political science similarly have their specialized contributions to make. For example, historians of political philosophy are better qualified than anyone else to study the evolution of consensus on fundamentals for periods for which few primary sociological data are available. (And, incidentally, our diagram, divided into sixteen squares, provides a convenient scheme for classifying political philosophies.) Jurisprudence and, in the United States, constitutional law are the disciplines best suited for the study of procedural fundamentals. Different "schools" of administration, both public and business, are well qualified to compare systems with regard to their stability and efficiency. Psychologists, in addition to providing insights into the decision process, may be most helpful in comparing the flexibility of systems. Students of communications are well qualified to study the flow of policy as it affects consensus, and so forth. But compartmentalization among these several disciplines should be avoided and, consequently, the tendency to think of the objects of their study as separate entities having an existence apart from one another. Any system studied by political science has all these aspects, but what makes it a political system is the processing, by means of certain procedures, of issues arising out of common problems that are obstacles on the road to goals. The procedures are applied to the whole range of problems faced—economic, power, cultural, constitutional, and others. Each of these problem areas provides the data for the several specialized disciplines. As soon as these problems are converted into issues and introduced into the flow of policy, they are, as it were, raised from the rock-bottom level of givenness, and the community that so raises them is a political system. If no problems are raised in this sense by an otherwise apparently somehow coherent aggregate of human beings, these people do not constitute a political system, except perhaps in the case of a very primitive and therefore pre-political community, unaware of its problems, its capacity to do something about them, and the feasibility of inventing new goals.

Just as this method avoids system compartmentalization, so it also avoids mechanical compartmentalization of functions, like legislation, execution, and adjudication, or policy-making and implementation. Another advantage is the more systematic and symmetrical relation in this approach between functions and the other dimensions of comparison—more than, e.g., the four input and three output functions (of the American separation of powers) of Almond's method, or the seven categories of functional analysis advanced by Lasswell. The latter, incidentally, could easily be "synchronized" with the eight subphases of the political process suggested here.

This approach, further, broadens the conventional identification of politics with power, mainly by returning to Thomas Hobbes' conception of power, which was wider than most contemporary usage of the term. Two advantages result. First, this method can be applied to any political system, regardless of size or scope, instead of being confined, as most current methods still are, to the state as defined by Max Weber. Some applications to different types of political systems, at different levels, will be sketched out below. Secondly, this approach facilitates the systematic inclusion in comparison of more factors, and more relevant factors, than are usually considered.

Partly because it broadens the conventional identification of politics with power, this method can offer improvements upon classifications like the following: constitutional democracy and totalitarianism (or autocracy), democratic and authoritarian, modern and traditional. The first of these pairs is usually defined with respect to power: its concentration and control, its exercise and scope. Friedrich's syndrome of totalitarianism, for example, cannot now be put on some kind of a scale that would permit the systematic comparison of political systems for the purpose of determining which are more or less totalitarian, or constitu-

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9 "Decision-making" was deliberately avoided, because the phrase is redundant: a decision is not a decision unless it has been made. By speaking of decision-making we suggest repeated cutoffs between successive but "separated" powers or functions and thereby deny the fluid continuity of the political process.

tional, autocratic or democratic.\(^{11}\) In fact, his syndrome might lead to condemning as potentially totalitarian some new African states as soon as they reach a certain level of industrialization. The method suggested here, by contrast, while taking into account such factors as “totality” of control, terror, propaganda, and “one-party system,” would relate all of these systematically to one another and to phasing of development, as well as success and the norm of responsibility.\(^{12}\) A similar improvement could be made upon Eckstein’s classification of authority patterns into democracy, authoritarianism, and constitutionalism, in which the main variables are “mass” and “elite,” participation, choice, transmission of instructions, autonomy, and a framework of rules.\(^{13}\) This scheme leads Eckstein to consider certain basic social relations and governmental functions as inherently undemocratic and authoritarian. For instance, if one condition of governmental democracy is “that elections must decide, in some basic way, the outcome of the competition for power and policies,” then evidently there cannot be a high degree of congruence between this governmental authority pattern and the social authority pattern of relations between children and their parents. But the suggestion that, if the latter is not democratic, it therefore tends toward authoritarianism, with a greater or lesser admixture of constitutionalism, hardly helps our systematic understanding of the relation between governmental and non-governmental authority patterns. The method outlined here is designed to facilitate the systematic description and comparison of authority patterns of families and other social and political units.

The various classifications that have been used to describe and explain French politics are another case in point: the traditionalist, bourgeois, and industrial orders; the traditions of authority, liberty, and equality; two “geological faults,” one caused by the Great Revolution, the other by the Industrial Revolution; the forces of order and the forces of movement (311–314); or the representative and administrative traditions.\(^{15}\) Each of these classifications, and the interpretation based upon it, contains valid insights which, moreover, need not contradict each other. For purposes of relating the phenomena covered by them to a systematic concept of politics, however, and for comparing them with similar or different but parallel phenomena in other political systems, they could easily be “translated” into the scheme proposed here.

Classifications based on the distinction between traditional and modern can also be refined by means of such a translation, which would widen their scope by asking questions like these: Is the stability of a traditional system more substantive or more procedural? Is a modernizing system deliberately recognizing new problems, or are these being forced on, or into, it? Is its flexibility greater with respect to constitutional procedures or technology, the production and distribution of goods, or defense against neighbors? And so forth.

Perhaps the greatest advantage that can be claimed for this approach is a very practical one, namely the easy translatability, noted in passing, of a wealth of extant material, both substantive and methodological, fruits of the labor of all the social sciences. To provide this easy convertibility was an intended purpose of this method. Conversely, the approach could be worked out in its present tentative form only by building it selectively upon the foundation of this wealth of available material. In order to put this method to use, no “staggering amount of empirical work . . . seems required.”\(^{16}\) The questions that it asks have already been asked of and answered about many political systems of all imaginable types, from a variety of small groups to the community of mankind. The empirical material is ready and waiting to be used in a comparative way.

One other advantage should be mentioned before moving on to possible objections. As already suggested in references to new and developing political systems, e.g., in Africa, this scheme is applicable to them. (431–441) In other words, it avoids the ethnocentricity of some other approaches designed to serve similar ends. It especially avoids what might be called the “Anglophile fallacy,” into which many western political scientists fall—for perfectly understandable reasons. (336–344)\(^{17}\) It


\(^{12}\) For a brief effort in this direction, see my Politics in Africa: Prospects South of the Sahara (Englewood Cliffs, 1962).


\(^{14}\) Ibid., p. 2.


\(^{16}\) Eckstein, op. cit., p. 46.

\(^{17}\) This bias was brought to my attention by
does not make universally valid criteria out of "the two-party system," regular alternation in office, a neutral civil service on the current British model, or "stable democracy." This method avoids the Anglophile fallacy by withdrawing our focus from the relatively transitory content of the problems faced by particular communities in periods of greatest interest to ourselves, and resetting our sights upon the basic goals that all political systems ever have been and will be pursuing. For the same reason it also avoids what might be called the "Cold War fallacy," into which many students of comparative government fall—for even more understandable reasons. They look upon all governments as either totalitarian or constitutionalist or somewhere between these two poles and tending in one or the other direction. They also sometimes convey the impression that the "history of all hitherto existing society" has been nothing but a determined preparation for the Cold War. One can almost detect the affinity of opposites between their approach and that of their Soviet counterparts. The latter assert that Soviet socialism is the penultimate manifestation of man's political genius. Our western colleagues seem to assume that western constitutional democracy is the final expression of human political genius. However, to the leaders of some of the new political systems in Africa, neither of these rather self-satisfied and ethnocentric approaches will appear very convincing. Nor does it to anyone else who retains faith in man's political inventiveness.

III

Some objections to the approach outlined here can perhaps be anticipated. The first of these is likely to be directed at the definition of community that has been used, because it fails to make "the absence or presence of violence as a means to settle disputes" the main criterion. For Haas,

The ideal type of political community . . . assumes, therefore, that the condition toward which the process of integration is to lead is one in which a sufficient body of general consensus imposes limitations upon the violence of group conflict.

Our notion of community, on the other hand, requires as a minimum only awareness of the pursuit of common goals, and of members' inability to solve alone the problems arising out of these goals. In this sense, there is a community between the parties to a civil or international war, as indeed between the contestants in the current Cold War, e.g., with regard to the goal of the survival of mankind. Non-violence and loyalty to institutions, other components of Haas' definition, were deliberately left out of ours, as part of the effort to shift attention away from the sovereign state and related units. The old focus of attention easily leads to a preoccupation with questions of "obedience" that seems increasingly anachronistic. Community in our sense of the word is worth studying because there exists within it at least some consensus.

A second objection is likely to be raised against failure to make non-violence in the settlement of disputes a criterion of the political system. All we require of a community to consider it a political system is that it process its issues—regardless of its style, including the incidence of violence, regardless even of failures to solve its problems. The motive was the same as before; e.g., there is a global political system and various international political systems within it. Most of these may not have been very successful, but they do process issues and sometimes solve some of their problems. They have politics and they are certainly worthy of study. Violence is one of several means of conducting politics and should not be excluded from our purview merely because its use fortunately has been reduced and regularized within many, and between some, modern states—but more in some than in others, which again shows the need for including the incidence of violence in comparisons.

A third objection may be made to apparent neglect of institutions, like presidents, cabinets, parliaments, and the like. This omission was intentional, in order to avoid fallacious comparisons, e.g., between the United States Congress and the Swiss Parliament. What matters is not the formal function, like legislation, assigned to an institution by its name or the constitution, but the phases of the flow of policy to which the institution and its personnel contribute. For example, comparison might show that the Swiss Parliament contributes less to the resolution of major issues than the Congress, because in Switzerland resolution is often provided by the referendum. In the global system, formulation has been quite decentralized, except with regard to issues dealt with by some of the older special-

Reginald Bartholomew of the University of Chicago. For an illustration, see Almond and Coleman, op. cit., pp. 52, 533, and passim.


19 Ibid., p. 6.
ized international agencies. So is resolution, while at least public deliberation is becoming increasingly centralized upon the United Nations. If we looked first for institutions and then asked what functions they performed, we would get a less comprehensive and less comparable picture than we do by first identifying the political process and then asking which subsystems and subcommunities contribute to its various phases.

A fourth objection might be raised against our apparent neglect of the role of groups in politics. This would, however, be based on a misreading of Part I. Communities whose members are aware of sharing special problems in common were discussed and are usually described as interest groups. The same is true of some of the subsystems discussed above. Again, use of the conventional words, including "political parties," was avoided on purpose, because it easily leads to erroneous universalization of the familiar, e.g., by projecting the American relation between interest organizations and parties onto, say, French or Ghanaian politics, or by assuming that interest groups everywhere are most active in bringing problems to the attention of politicians (sub-phase 1) and then later in helping lower level administrators with the solution of their own special problems (sub-phase 8), when they may actually contribute more to deliberation or to resolution.

A fifth objection might be made to the relation between "society" and the political system that we are assuming: which is "prior"? Society and its institutions are chronologically prior in the sense that all deliberately created contemporary political systems were superimposed upon pre-existing societies. But these political systems often were superimposed precisely in order to bring about changes in the society or, frequently, the several societies comprising them, and in their institutions and values. After this kind of change, and to the extent that it brought intended or unintended results, habits and characteristics conventionally called "social" or "national" become effects rather than causes of political style. (192-193)

A sixth but certainly not final objection might raise the question of agreement among investigators. Even if two students accepted this approach, could they not come up with quite different descriptions of the same phenomena, e.g., in the exercise of comparison immediately following? That is, could not an issue be described as violent by one scholar, and as pragmatic by another? This kind of disagreement should not be possible after further refinement of the method, especially with respect to comparisons. But even if it were unavoidable, the method would still have the merit of asking sets of questions that are both comprehensive and systematically interrelated.

IV

The purpose of systematic comparison is to facilitate explanation of differences. Without such explanations and the understanding to which they contribute, the conduct of responsible politics is impossible. In this sense, political science can contribute a great deal to the foreknowledge required for improvement of situations of responsibility. The following illustrations do no more than to sketch some suggestions of how this approach can be put to work to provide explanations.

A Backward Society and the Village in the Vaucluse. The southern Italian village of Montegrano analyzed by Banfield seems comparable to Wylie's Peyrane. Banfield quotes Hume's saying that an explanation is a place where the mind comes to rest. He considers the moral basis of the society "the strategic, or limiting factor." This moral basis is the ethos of "amoral familism," which has been produced by three factors acting in combination: a high death rate, certain land tenure conditions, and the absence of the institutions of the extended family.

Banfield suggests that the village of southern France described by Wylie . . . exemplifies, perhaps, the adaptation the ethos of amoral familism would make to improved economic circumstances. The average income in Peyrane seems to be at least twice that in Montegrano. Wylie, like Banfield, found that the people he studied "do not unite to work together for any cause. . . ." But life is much better in Peyrane than in Montegrano. Wylie's explanation of his community's relative success is also strongly centered on the family.

These two political systems can easily be compared in terms of the incidence of issues in them. (Figure 16) In internal Montegrano politics, (a) stands for a mild anti-clericalism,
FIGURE 16. Systematic comparisons of issues, A.

(b) for municipal elections, in which voting patterns are unstable and voting motivation mainly personal resentment against candidates, (c) for criminal violence, (d) for litigation, of which there is a great deal and (e) for petty corruption. In internal Peyrane politics, (a) anti-clericalism is a more lively issue, (b) local elections revolve around less extreme issues than in Montegrano, like the need for a new sewage system and public baths, (c) criminal or other violence is lacking, as are (d) litigation—the men say “homme de loi, homme de merde” and corruption. The mayor got parents of school children to threaten a unanimous school boycott (f), in order to put pressure on the French Government to provide a new school building and, at the same time, to regain local electoral support from the Communists, recently popular as a result of a successful ochre miners’ strike (g). (A village near Montegrano had strikes, but not Montegrano itself.) The organization of annual dances presented a recurrent issue (h). Opposition between Communists and Roman Catholics, while not precluding occasional alliances in municipal campaigns, is a sometimes more ideological, sometimes more pragmatic issue (i). Organization of the hunt club and its affiliation with neighboring clubs is another hotly debated item (j).

The main differences between the two systems are apparent. In Montegrano, the issues are farther from the intersection of the two coordinates than in Peyrane, and there are fewer issues. The issue formulating phase is being performed very poorly in Montegrano. In Peyrane, it is being performed very well, at least relative to the problems that citizens consider important. The conduct of a kind of politics over questions of dance organization or hunt club policies keeps the flow of policy in constant circulation and enables it to pick up the “truly” political issues when necessary. This tends to strengthen procedural consensus and suggests one intermediate explanation for the different success of the two systems: the people of Peyrane are more experienced in the use of procedures on which they are generally agreed. The people of Montegrano are utterly inexperienced in the use of any political procedures, but if they were experienced, chances are they would be in profound disagreement on the propriety of whatever procedures they were familiar with. This in turn suggests that doubling the level of income in Montegrano by itself would not make it any more successful than it is, because its people are procedurally incapable of absorbing this economic improvement or even recognizing the new problems this would raise, and even less capable of solving them. We could almost describe Montegrano as a pre-political system, because its people are largely unaware of the feasibility of doing something about their common problems. If we compared Montegrano with an economically much more backward African tribe which, however, uses old and widely popular procedures for settling quarrels or allocating land, the Africans would be found more successful in operating their political system than the Montegranesi, and would probably prove more flexible in absorbing economic help from the outside.

The pattern of external issues differs from the internal one, because it is part of the pattern of the national Italian or French systems, of which these villages are only small subsystems. (Figure 17) The external issues in Montegrano are (a) an uncomprehending opposition to the outside world which is believed to be utterly capricious in its operations as these affect the village; (b) party conflicts in national politics, on which voting behavior is as erratic as in local elections; (c) a slumbering potential of anti-state violence of the kind that has historically erupted in southern Italian peasant uprisings; and (d) relations with the State

26 Ibid., p. 182.

27 See my Politics in Africa, p. 155 and passim.
administration, which is concerned almost exclusively with the police aspects of its mission in Montegrano; and (e) the fear of corruption.

The external issues in Peyrane are (a) a more clearly defined feeling of suspicion for les autres of the outside world which is, however, believed to operate according to fairly rational procedures, of which the Peyranais avail themselves in order to get out of the French State what they want from it, e.g., in national elections (b); (c) the use of organized violence in defense of firmly cherished values, as by the maquis against the Germans during World War II; and (d) relations with various branches of the bureaucracy, in which "contacts" are used pragmatically, but stopping short of bribery and corruption, in order to round out the square compartments of regulated existence into which the administration would like to fit the village and its citizens. In the case of the school issue (f), internal consensus generated by the mayor was applied to the national political process at those points where it was most likely to bring, and did bring, the desired results. Relations with other hunt clubs (j) and many other issues of "external relations"—transportation and communication, conscription, social security, etc.—also play a role, most of them arising near the central intersection.

The difference between the two patterns again revolves around the higher and more centripetal incidence of issues in Peyrane. Montegrano's internal and external patterns differ, in that the former shows no serious ideologism, whereas the latter shows no serious legalism. As members of their subsystem, the Montegranesi are not aware of any constitutional problems arising out of their relations with the Italian State. Consensus on procedures is strong, not because of general familiarity with them, but because the possibility of adapting them to changed needs does not occur to anyone. This strength of consensus, in turn, has the result of letting potential leaders of substantive reforms—like Montegrano's equivalent of Peyrane's school improvement movement—perceive their roles in a very stagnant, legalistic way: only men in official positions have the right to approach the prefect with such proposals, but they are unlikely to do so, because their official role calls for compliance with administrative instructions. Once more, Montegrano's underdevelopment is mainly procedural. New problems are not recognized in it, only for it by the outside administration, which then formulates and deliberates and, if things ever get that far, resolves issues for Montegrano. In Peyrane, by contrast, this process is operated by the local people themselves, or as part of the national policy flow with their participation. It is true that problems that have gone through the whole political process in Peyrane are not necessarily solved in the end: by the time The Village in the Vaucluse was published, the promised school had not yet been built. However, in terms of our criteria, non-solution of an otherwise fully processed problem has to be considered more successful than solution of a problem handled entirely by administrators who are not members of the community. The supreme value is balanced participation in politics itself: man is a political being.28

How can these differences be explained? We have already rejected an economic explanation in favor of a procedural one, by making the comparison with the African community. Banfield mentions an historical factor, the late and incomplete abolition of feudalism in southern Italy, by contrast with northern Italy and France. Since the Revolution, the peasants of the Vaucluse have owned their land and have been individually responsible for their own and their families' welfare. They have not been dependent upon resident or non-resident land-

28 How much this approach owes to Aristotle should by now be evident.
lords. Their community has been much more egalitarian. Peyrane lacks the equivalent of Montegrano’s “upper-class circle,” between whose members and the rest of the village there is very little community feeling. Individual economic responsibility has combined with egalitarianism to reduce fatalism in Peyrane. Small children, both before and in school, are brought up according to very regular rules, while they are raised capriciously in Montegrano. This could be explained by reference to “family values,” but the overwhelming bias of the social sciences in favor of such sociological explanations warrants at least exploration of the reverse. According to this comparison, the much more pragmatic, erratic, capricious, and incomprehensible operation of Italian politics may have contributed to equally deficient child-raising habits, rather than the reverse. The Third Republic and the Italian Monarchy were contemporaries, but France did not have an equivalent of trasformismo in its worst form. French deputies had to “produce” for their constituents to get re-elected and—at least as important—the parliamentary system enabled them to produce. For purposes of the present illustration, we cannot pursue this question any further, but it seems something other than a chicken-or-egg question.

Sources of political, but not only of political, authority in Peyrane are procedural, in Montegrano substantive. School children in Peyrane value honesty and non-violence most highly, whereas (though Banfield did not inquire into this) they probably value such qualities as physical strength, good looks, and substantive learning most highly in Montegrano. Banfield agrees with this estimate when he suggests that “Perhaps the best starting place [for reform] would be the organization of village soccer teams.”

In Peyrane, boules is the favorite sport, with very complicated rules, about which people argue a great deal. Of course, boules is not cricket, but it is better than nothing and has been played for many generations in the Vaucluse. In any case, the problem of reform initiated from the outside does not arise for Peyrane. Its citizens are in comparatively sound situations of responsibility, in their own view. And if we or other outsiders were to advance proposals for the reform of the political system, the proposals would be torn up—as was the telegram sent to the local communist head of the maquis by the departmental “purge chief” upon the Liberation of the Vaucluse, with the words, “Nous réglons nos affaires en famille!” Regler means “to rule” in the procedural sense.

France and Great Britain. The relative failure of French politics is often explained with reference to France’s lack of consensus, and the success of British politics in terms of “agreement on fundamentals.” We can compare present consensus in the two countries by showing the close clustering of major British issues around the central intersection, and the centrifugal scattering of French issues which shows up strongly in the direction of violence and ideologism. If our mind will come to rest in the England of Henry VIII, we can begin an explanation with his success in making the single problem of relations with Rome the dominant issue of his reign, and in solving this problem in an effective manner. Formulation and solution were of greatest concern in this period. Next, in the seventeenth century, this previous success in solving the religious problem facilitated the processing of another single problem, the overwhelming importance of which was generally recognized, namely, the problem of the constitution. It was solved with the help of ideological commitment (even though new issues about the already “solved” religious problem were raised) and the use of organized force in the Civil Wars. After the Glorious Revolution, sufficient constitutional consensus had been built up to enable the British to be first in recognizing the possibilities of the Industrial Revolution, another problem of single undiluted impact upon the system, and to solve the contemporary manifestations of this problem.

In the French case, the religious, constitutional, and industrial revolutions, each accorded priority by different subsystems, made a simultaneous impact, and violence was used not only to attempt resolution of each issue, but also to resolve the issue of priority among them. As a result, the use of violence itself became an issue. Much less constitutional consensus than in Britain was built up, none of the problems was solved effectively, and the issues down to this day continue to arise at the extremes. French politicians more often enjoy authority from identification with the substantive goals of the groups they lead, than from identification with parliamentary procedures, at least by comparison with British politicians. The same difference is echoed in former colonies of these two powers.

The Soviet Union. This approach can be used to compare different periods of one political

29 Banfield, op. cit., p. 173.
31 See Politics in Africa, p. 143.
FIGURE 18. Styles in successive periods of the Soviet system.

system and thereby to help explain its development. Since the Bolshevik Party "became the State," we have to start this sketch with Lenin before the Revolution (1), when he had nothing but ideological commitment. (Figure 18) Next "comes the Revolution," in which violence was used ruthlessly and ideological principle sometimes sacrificed for pragmatic considerations (2). During the N.E.P. period, Soviet style turned more pragmatic, still less ideological, and somewhat less violent (3). Under Stalin, it was pragmatically violent (4). Since his death, Soviet internal politics has become less violent, somewhat more ideological but also more purposeful, and slightly "legal" without becoming excessively legalistic (5). Issues in Soviet domestic policies—both publicized and, more important, behind the scenes—seem to be clustering closer around the central intersection than ever before, though still not as closely as in constitutional systems.

There is no element of determinism in this account. Lenin was initially ideological because of his exclusion and self-exclusion from "legitimate" Russian politics. In the Revolution, power and other resources were harnessed to the ideologically defined goals in order to solve the ideologically defined problems. Because of changes in the environment of the revolutionaries, they also began to show a degree of flexibility, especially with regard to economic aspects of their problems. In the next phase of development, they could have turned toward legalism, as colonial independence movements sometimes do at a parallel stage of development, especially if they base their claim to independence on treaty obligations of the colonial power or on their "rights" under constitutional documents like the United Nations Charter. The Soviets did not turn toward legalism partly as a consequence of the Marxist rejection of the state. Similarly, Marxist preoccupation with substantive economic problems led to the increased pragmatism of the N.E.P. period. Development in the last two phases (until the present) suggests—as would comparison with other totalitarian systems—that there are no "inherent laws" of totalitarian development. More important, phases (2) to (5) illustrate the variety of totalitarianism that is logically and practically possible. An understanding of this variety may be of use in preventing the rise of and combatting totalitarianism.

Sources of authority have also been subject to change in Soviet history. At first, theoretical brilliance or orthodoxy were the most important sources. Revolutionary achievement followed. Both are substantive sources, the former being goal-oriented, the latter problem-oriented. During the N.E.P. period, managerial skills, partly procedural, began to be recognized for the first time, and they have increased in importance in the post-Stalin decade. Meanwhile, however, substantive sources continue to predominate for men in the top positions: identification with the Revolution or with its major figures, demonstrated ability in manipulating the machinery of power or propaganda, "production victories," and the like. But one can anticipate that, when the revolutionary generation has died, one of the hitherto most important sources of authority will dry up, and more procedural trends may develop.

World Politics. Since the most important phases of international politics are being conducted increasingly by the leaders of states instead of professional diplomats and military officers as formerly, these leaders' sources of authority and the style of their political systems are of some interest. (442–465) Despite poorer communications, international relations until World War I had a more unified style than they have today. Diplomats and military who, respectively, performed most of the deliberation and resolution, operated within a fairly strong consensus on the rules of diplomacy and warfare. Today, though improved communications are centralizing deliberation, and even the formulation of issues, in the global political process, such consensus is lacking. The sources of authority, for example, of the current candidates for participation in a summit meeting vary widely. A summit meeting, once it reaches agreement on its agenda (formulation of issues), would presumably conduct deliberation in hopes of reaching resolution or, at least,
agreement on the postponement of resolution for issues that, for the time being, can be settled only violently. But of the four participants, only Macmillan and Kennedy have procedural sources of authority and much experience with deliberation conducted according to clearly understood rules. General De Gaulle’s military career and his achievements as leader of the Free French and founder of the Fifth Republic endow him with quite a different type of authority, somewhat closer to that held by President Eisenhower at the time of his first summit conference. Khrushchev’s sources of authority have just been adumbrated. Deliberation of world political issues has the disadvantages of an unbalanced system, already mentioned earlier. It also changes the types of issues that are generated for world politics. Under traditional diplomacy, typical issues related to legal and power problems. Flexibility was the most persistent goal. Today, cultural and economic problems, or the cultural and economic aspects of legal and power problems, are more often introduced into the international flow of policy. Stability is the most persistent goal. (Figure 19) This has a feedback effect by increasing the proportion of ideologically and pragmatically inclined participants in world politics, e.g., in the case of the United States the U.S.I.A. and the C.I.A. Ideologism and pragmatism have been described as true opposites, as have legalism and violence. This means that they cannot “co-exist” in a system at any one time. This fits the international system, in which one political style is usually succeeded by its opposite. While von Clausewitz’s dictum was still valid, war was the continuation of diplomacy by other means. Today, subversion and guerrilla warfare are the continuation of propaganda by other means. Perhaps this is the crucial difference between old fashioned international relations and the Cold War.

The importance of propaganda and the possibilities presented by world-wide communications suggest another use to which this approach might be put. An understanding of the style of a political system and its subsystems in terms of the categories suggested here can be of help in deciding how to “pitch” one’s appeal or what sort of “image” to present. Specialists in public relations have, of course, been doing that for decades, in terms of their own categories, and the great propaganda agencies are doing it today. Skillful politicians of all ages have accomplished the same thing more or less intuitively. Most opinion polls or attitude surveys concentrate upon the substance of their subjects’ feelings, and this substance has been known to change even more rapidly and more radically than the issues themselves. By getting an accurate picture of the style of politics along lines suggested here, on the other hand, one should be able to get at the more enduring patterns of attitudes and behavior, because this approach focuses on the manner in which people are likely to process whatever problems come their way, rather than on specific reactions to the substance of particular problems. This should be of some use in world politics, too, because of the quick succession of vast changes in the problems that make up its raw material.

This instability and the fluctuating, overlapping, intermeshing, clashing, simultaneously centralizing and fragmenting, expanding and contracting character of world politics points to one final advantage of the method that has been tentatively put forward in this paper. In the beginning (note 6), a warning was issued—in what may have seemed a rather cavalier fashion—against confusing “stability” with “boundary maintenance.” Whether this latter function was transferred to politics from biology or physics, in conventional sovereign nation states boundary maintenance is taken care of by the military together with customs and immigration police. But students of politics are no longer concerned primarily with this unit of politics. Political science is concerned with politics at all levels, in all kinds of communities. Today, and in the immediate future, its attention will be drawn especially to politics in the global community of mankind, in and for which a political system is slowly being built up. And the boundaries for that political system do not have to be maintained, they only have to be grown into.