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Author(s): Gabriel A. Almond

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COMPARATIVE POLITICAL SYSTEMS*

GABRIEL A. ALMOND
Princeton University

WHAT I PROPOSE to do in this brief paper is to suggest how the application of certain sociological and anthropological concepts may facilitate systematic comparison among the major types of political systems operative in the world today.

At the risk of saying the obvious, I am not suggesting to my colleagues in the field of comparative government that social theory is a conceptual cure-all for the ailments of the discipline. There are many ways of laboring in the vineyard of the Lord, and I am quite prepared to concede that there are more musical forms of psalmody than sociological jargon. I suppose the test of the sociological approach that is discussed here is whether or not it enables us to solve certain persistent problems in the field more effectively than we now are able to solve them.

Our expectations of the field of comparative government have changed in at least two ways in the last decades. In the first place as American interests have broadened to include literally the whole world, our course offerings have expanded to include the many areas outside of Western Europe — Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Secondly, as our international interests have expanded and become more urgent, our requirements in knowledge have become more exacting. We can no longer view political crises in France with detached curiosity or view countries such as Indo-China and Indonesia as interesting political pathologies. We are led to extend our discipline and intensify it simultaneously.

It would simply be untrue to say that the discipline of comparative government has not begun to meet both of these challenges. As rapidly as it has been possible to train the personnel, new areas have been opened up to teaching and research; and there has been substantial encouragement to those who have been tempted to explore new aspects of the political process both here and abroad and to employ new methods in such research. It is precisely because

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of the eagerness and energy with which these challenges have been met that the field is now confronted with the problem of systematic cumulation and comparison. What appears to be required in view of the rapid expansion of the field are more comparative efforts in the tradition of *Finer* and *Friedrich*, if we are to gain the maximum in insight and knowledge from this large-scale research effort.

The problem to which this paper is a tentative and provisional answer is the following. With the proliferation of courses and special studies of specific "governments" and groupings of governments on an area or other bases, is it possible to set up and justify a preliminary classification into which most of the political systems which we study today can be assigned? The classifications which we now employ are particularistic (e.g., American Government, British Government, the Soviet Union, and the like); regional (e.g., Government and Politics of the Far East, Latin America, and the like); or political (e.g., the British Commonwealth, Colonial Government, and the like); or functional (e.g., the comprehensive comparative efforts limited to the European-American area, such as *Finer* and *Friedrich*, and the specific institutional comparisons such as comparative parties, and comparative administration).

Anyone concerned with this general problem of classification of political systems will find that all of the existing bases of classification leave something to be desired. Dealing with governments particularistically is no classification at all. A regional classification is based not on the properties of the political systems, but on their contiguity in space. The existing structural classifications, such as democracy-dictatorship, parliamentary-presidential systems, two-party and multi-party systems, often turn out to miss the point, particularly when they are used in the strikingly different political systems of the pre-industrial areas. There may be a certain use therefore in exploring the possibilities of other ways of classifying political systems. What is proposed here is just one of these ways, and because of the uneven state of our knowledge is necessarily crude and provisional.

In my own efforts to stand far off, so to speak, and make the grossest discriminations between types of empirical political systems operative in the world today, I have found a fourfold classification to be most useful: the Anglo-American (including some members of the Commonwealth), the Continental European (exclusive of the Scandinavian and Low Countries, which combine some of the fea-

tures of the Continental European and the Anglo-American), the pre-industrial, or partially industrial, political systems outside the European-American area, and the totalitarian political systems. This classification will not include all the political systems in existence today, but it comes close to doing so. It will serve the purpose of today's discussion, which is not that of testing the inclusiveness of this classification but rather the usefulness of sociological concepts in bringing out the essential differences between these political systems.

The terms which I shall use in discriminating the essential properties of these classes have emerged out of the Weber-Parsons tradition in social theory.¹ I shall try to suggest why I find some of these concepts useful. First, a political system is a system of *action*. What this means is that the student of political systems is concerned with empirically observable behavior. He is concerned with norms or institutions in so far as they affect behavior. Emphasizing "action" merely means that the description of a political system can never be satisfied by a simple description of its legal or ethical norms. In other words, political institutions or persons performing political rôles are viewed in terms of what it is that they do, why they do it, and how what they do is related to and affects what others do. The term *system*² satisfies the need for an inclusive concept which covers all of the patterned actions relevant to the making of political decisions. Most political scientists use the term *political process* for these purposes. The difficulty with the term *process* is that it means any patterning of action through time. In contrast to *process*, the concept of *system* implies a *totality* of relevant units, an interdependence between the interactions of units, and a certain stability in the interaction of these units (perhaps best described as a changing equilibrium).

The unit of the political system is the rôle. The rôle, according to Parsons and Shils, ". . . is that organized sector of an actor's orientation which constitutes and defines his participation in an interactive process."³ It involves a set of complementary expectations

¹See in particular Max Weber, *The Theory of Social And Economic Organization*, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 87 ff.

²See David Easton, *The Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science*, (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1953), pp. 90 ff.

³Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., *Toward a General Theory of Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 23.

concerning his own actions and those of others with whom he interacts. Thus a political system may be defined as a set of interacting rôles, or as a structure of rôles, if we understand by *structure* a patterning of interactions. The advantage of the concept of *rôle* as compared with such terms as *institutions*, *organizations*, or *groups*, is that it is a more inclusive and more open concept. It can include formal offices, informal offices, families, electorates, mobs, casual as well as persistent groupings, and the like, in so far as they enter into and affect the political system. The use of other concepts such as those indicated above involves ambiguity, forced definitions, (such as groups) or residual categories. Like the concept of system it does not prejudice our choice of units but rather enables us to nominate them on the basis of empirical investigation.

While there appear to be certain advantages in these concepts of political system and rôle for our purposes, they confront the political scientist with a serious problem. While he intends the concept to have a general application, Parsons appears to have had before him in elaborating the concept the model of the primary group — family, friendship, and the like — and not complex social systems, the units of which are collectivities and not individual actors. In this sense the sociological concept of system and of rôle can only be a beginning of a conceptual model of the political system. The job of developing additional concepts necessary to handle macrocosmic social systems such as political systems — national and international — is still to be done.

My own conception of the distinguishing properties of the political system proceeds from Weber's definition — the legitimate monopoly of physical coercion over a given territory and population.⁴ The political systems with which most political scientists concern themselves all are characterized by a specialized apparatus which possesses this legitimate monopoly, and the political system consists of those interacting rôles which affect its employment. There are, of course, simpler societies in which this function of maintenance of order through coercion is diffuse and unspecialized; it is combined with other functions in the family and other groupings. While these systems are also properly the subject matter of political science, there are few political scientists indeed with the specialized equipment necessary to study them.

⁴From *Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 78.

It may be useful to add a few comments about this definition of politics and the political in order to avoid misunderstanding. To define politics as having this distinguishing property of monopolizing legitimate coercion in a given territory is not the same thing as saying that this is *all* that government does. It is the thing that government does and that other social systems ordinarily may not do legitimately. Other social systems may employ other forms of compulsion than physical coercion. Some indeed may legitimately employ physical coercion on a limited scale. But the employment of *ultimate*, *comprehensive*, and *legitimate* physical coercion is the monopoly of states, and the political system is uniquely concerned with the scope, the direction, and the conditions affecting the employment of this physical coercion. It is, of course, clear that political systems protect freedoms and provide welfare, as well as impose order backed up by physical compulsion, but even their protection of freedom and their provision of welfare is characteristically backed up by the threat of physical compulsion. Hence it seems appropriate to define the political system as the patterned interaction of rôles affecting decisions backed up by the threat of physical compulsion.

The task of describing a political system consists in characterizing all the patterned interactions which take place within it. It takes us beyond the legal system into all the rôles which occur and involves our defining these rôles in action or behavioral terms. The concept of system implies that these rôles are interdependent and that a significant change in any one rôle affects changes in the others, and thereby changes the system as a whole. Thus the emergence of pressure groups in the present century produced certain changes in the party system and in the administrative and legislative processes. The rapid expansion of executive bureaucracy was one of the factors that triggered off the development of legislative bureaucracy and pressure group bureaucracy. Changes in the rôle of political communication have transformed the electoral process, the behavior of parties, the legislature, the executive. The concepts of system and of interdependence lead us to look for these changes when any specific rôle changes significantly. It suggests the usefulness of thinking at the level of the system and its interdependence rather than in terms of discrete phenomena or only

limited bilateral relationships, or relationships occurring only within the formal-legal rôle structure.

The fourth concept is *orientation to political action*. Every political system is embedded in a set of meanings and purposes. We speak of "attitudes toward politics," "political values," "ideologies," "national character," "cultural ethos." The difficulty with all these terms is that their meanings are diffuse and ambiguous. The concepts of orientation to action and of the pattern variables are useful since they at least attempt logical distinctness and comprehensiveness. It is not essential for my purposes to go into the modes of orientation of action, or into the "pattern variables" in detail. Parsons and Shils tell us that any orientation to politics involves three components: the first is perception, or *cognition*; the second is preference, involvement, or affect (*cathexis*); the third is evaluation or choice through the application of standards or values to the cognitive and affective components. By *cognition* is meant the knowledge and discrimination of the objects, events, actions, issues, and the like. By *cathexis* is meant the investment of objects, issues, etc., with emotional significance, or affect. By *evaluation* is meant the manner in which individuals organize and select their perceptions, preferences, and values in the process of establishing a position *vis-à-vis political action*.⁵

Every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action. I have found it useful to refer to this as the *political culture*. There are two points to be made regarding the concept of political culture. First, it does not coincide with a given political system or society. Patterns of orientation to politics may, and usually do, extend beyond the boundaries of political systems. The second point is that the political culture is not the same thing as the general culture, although it is related to it. Because political orientation involves cognition, intellection, and adaptation to external situations, as well as the standards and values of the general culture, it is a differentiated part of the culture and has a certain autonomy. Indeed, it is the failure to give proper weight to the cognitive and evaluative factors, and to the consequent autonomy of political culture, that has been responsible for the exaggerations and over-simplifications of the "national character" literature of recent years.

⁵Parsons and Shils, *op. cit.*, pp. 58 ff.

The usefulness of the concept of political culture and its meaning may perhaps be conveyed more effectively through illustration. I would argue that the United States, England, and several of the Commonwealth countries have a common political culture, but are separate and different kinds of political systems. And I would argue that the typical countries of continental Western Europe, while constituting individual political systems, include several different political cultures which extend beyond their borders. In other words, they are political systems with fragmented political cultures.

In an effort to overcome understandable resistances to the introduction of a new term, I should like to suggest why I find the concept of political culture more useful than the terms we now employ, such as *ideology* or *political party*. As I understand the term *ideology*, it means the systematic and explicit formulation of a general orientation to politics. We need this term to describe such political phenomena as these and should not reduce its specificity by broadening it to include not only the explicit doctrinal structure characteristically borne by a minority of *militants*, but also the vaguer and more implicit orientations which generally characterize political followings. The term *political party* also cannot serve our purpose, for we are here dealing with a formal organization which may or may not be a manifestation of a political culture. Indeed, we will be gravely misled if we try to force the concept of party to mean political culture. Thus the commonly used distinctions between one-party, two-party, and multi-party systems simply get nowhere in distinguishing the essential properties of the totalitarian, the Anglo-American, and the Continental European political systems. For the structure we call *party* in the totalitarian system is not a party at all; the two parties of the Anglo-American system are organized manifestations of a homogeneous political culture; and the multi-parties of Continental European political systems in some cases are and in some cases are not the organized manifestations of different political cultures.

But the actual test of the usefulness of this conceptual scheme can only come from a more detailed application of it in developing the special properties of the classes of political systems to which we earlier referred.

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The Anglo-American political systems are characterized by a *homogeneous, secular* political culture. By a secular political culture I mean a multi-valued political culture, a rational-calculating, bargaining, and experimental political culture. It is a homogeneous culture in the sense that there is a sharing of political ends and means. The great majority of the actors in the political system accept as the ultimate goals of the political system some combination of the values of freedom, mass welfare, and security. There are groups which stress one value at the expense of the others; there are times when one value is stressed by all groups; but by and large the tendency is for all these values to be shared, and for no one of them to be completely repressed. To a Continental European this kind of political culture often looks sloppy. It has no logic, no clarity. This is probably correct in an intellectual sense, since this balancing of competing values occurs below the surface among most people and is not explicated in any very elegant way. Actually the logic is complex and is constantly referred to reality in an inductive process. It avoids the kind of logical simplism which characterizes much of the Continental European ideological polemic.

A secularized political system involves an individuation of and a measure of autonomy among the various rôles. Each one of the rôles sets itself up autonomously in political business, so to speak. There tends to be an arms-length bargaining relationship among the rôles. The political system is saturated with the atmosphere of the market. Groups of electors come to the political market with votes to sell in exchange for policies. Holders of offices in the formal-legal rôle structure tend to be viewed as agents and instrumentalities, or as brokers occupying points in the bargaining process. The secularized political process has some of the characteristics of a laboratory; that is, policies offered by candidates are viewed as hypotheses, and the consequences of legislation are rapidly communicated within the system and constitute a crude form of testing hypotheses. Finally, because the political culture tends to be homogeneous and pragmatic, it takes on some of the atmosphere of a game. A game is a good game when the outcome is in doubt and when the stakes

are not too high. When the stakes are too high, the tone changes from excitement to anxiety. While "fun" is frequently an aspect of Anglo-American politics, it is rarely a manifestation of Continental European politics; and, unless one stretches the definition, it never occurs at all in totalitarian politics.

RÔLE STRUCTURE IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The rôle structure in this group of political systems is (1) highly differentiated, (2) manifest, organized, and bureaucratized, (3) characterized by a high degree of stability in the functions of the rôles, and (4) likely to have a diffusion of power and influence within the political system as a whole.

With regard to the first point, each one of the units — formal governmental agencies, political parties, pressure groups and other kinds of voluntary associations, the media of communication, and "publics" of various kinds — pursues specialized purposes and performs specialized functions in the system. As was already pointed out, each one of these entities is more or less autonomous — interdependent, but autonomous. Certainly there are striking differences in this respect as between the United States and the United Kingdom, but their similarity becomes clear in contrast to the other major types of systems which will be described below. Secondly, this rôle structure is manifest and on the surface. Most of the potential "interests" have been organized and possess bureaucracies. Thirdly, there is in contrast to some of the other systems a relatively high degree of stability of function in the various parts of the structure. Bureaucracies function as bureaucracies, armies as armies, parliaments as parliaments. The functions are not ordinarily substitutable as among these various institutions and organizations, in contrast to some of the other systems. This is another way of saying that the political division of labor is more complex, more explicit, and more stable. There are, of course, striking differences between the British and American versions in these respects. For the American system is at the same time more complex and less stable than the British. There are, for example, many more pressure groups and types of pressure groups in the United States for reasons of size, economic complexity, and ethnic and religious heterogeneity. Furthermore there is more substitutability of func-

tion in the American system, more policy-making by pressure groups and the media of communication, more intervention in policy-making through the transient impact of "public moods." But again if we are comparing the Anglo-American system with, for example, the pre-industrial or partially industrial systems, the British and American systems will stand out by virtue of their similarities on the score of complexity, manifestness, and stability of rôle structure.

Finally the Anglo-American type of political system is one in which there is a diffusion of power and influence. This is only partially expressed in the formal legal phraseology of a democratic suffrage and representative government. There is an effective as well as a legal diffusion of power, resulting from a system of mass communications, mass education, and representation by interest groups. Here again the British and American versions differ sharply in terms of formal governmental structure, the relations between parties and pressure groups, and the system of communication and education. The net result is a more centralized, predictable rôle structure in Britain than in the United States.

THE PRE-INDUSTRIAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The political systems which fall under this very general category are the least well-known of all four of the classes discussed here. But despite our relative ignorance in this area and our inability to elaborate the many sub-types which no doubt exist, a discussion of this kind of political system is analytically useful since it presents such a striking contrast to the homogeneous, secular political culture, and the complex and relatively stable rôle structure of the Anglo-American political system.

The pre-industrial — or partially industrialized and Westernized — political systems may be best described as mixed political cultures and mixed political systems. Nowhere does the need for additional vocabulary become clearer than in the analysis of these systems; for here parliaments tend to be something other than parliaments, parties and pressure groups behave in unusual ways, bureaucracies and armies often dominate the political system, and there is an atmosphere of unpredictability and gunpowder surrounding the political system as a whole.

Some clarity is introduced into the understanding of these systems if one recognizes that they are embedded in mixed political cultures. What this means is that as a minimum we have two political cultures, the Western system with its parliament, its electoral system, its bureaucracy and the like, and the pre-Western system or systems. In countries such as India there are many traditional political cultures which intermingle with the Western system. What kind of amalgam emerges from this impingement of different political cultures will depend on at least five factors: (1) the type of traditional cultures which are involved; (2) the auspices under which Westernization has been introduced (e.g., Western colonial powers, or native élites); (3) the functions of the society which have been Westernized; (4) the tempo and tactics of the Westernization process; (5) the type of Western cultural products which have been introduced. As a consequence of this impingement of the Western and traditional political cultures, there is a third type of political culture which frequently emerges in this type of system; what in Max Weber's language may be called a charismatic political culture. It often happens as a consequence of the erosion of a traditional political culture that powerful forces are released — anxieties over the violation of sacred customs and relationships, feelings of rootlessness and directionlessness because of the rejection of habitual routines. The impact of the Western rational system on the traditional system or systems often creates a large potential for violence. One of the typical manifestations of this conflict of political cultures is the charismatic nationalism which occurs so frequently in these areas and which may be in part understood as being a movement toward accepting a new system of political norms, or a movement toward reaffirming the older traditional ones, often both in peculiar combinations. To overcome the resistance of habitual routines backed up by supernatural sanctions, the new form of legitimacy must represent a powerful affirmation capable of breaking up deeply ingrained habits and replacing earlier loyalties. Thus, at the minimum, we must have in these political systems the old or the traditional political culture, or cultures, the new or the Western-rational political culture, and transitional or resultant political phenomena of one kind or another. Needless to say, this typical mixture of political cultures presents the most serious problems of communication and co-

ordination. We are dealing with a political system in which large groups have fundamentally different "cognitive maps" of politics and apply different norms to political action. Instability and unpredictability are not to be viewed as pathologies but as inescapable consequences of this type of mixture of political cultures.

RÔLE STRUCTURE IN THE PRE-INDUSTRIAL POLITICAL SYSTEMS

These characteristics of the pre-industrial political systems may be brought out more clearly and systematically in an analysis of the political rôle structure which is more or less characteristic.

There is first a relatively low degree of structural differentiation. Political interest often tends to be latent and when it emerges into politics often takes the form of spontaneous, violent action. Political parties are unstable; they fragment and consolidate, appear and disappear. There is ordinarily only a rudimentary specialized system of communication. Unless there is a bureaucracy left by a Western colonial power, the bureaucratic structure may be only partially developed.

Secondly, because of the absence of a stable and explicit rôle structure, there is likely to be a high degree of *substitutability* of rôles. Thus bureaucracies may take over the legislative function, and armies may and often do the same. A political party may pre-empt the policy-making function, or a mob may emerge and take the center of the policy-making stage for a brief interval. In other words, in contrast to the Anglo-American political systems, there is no stable division of political labor.

A third and most important aspect of these political systems is the mixing of political rôle structures. Thus there may be a parliament formally based on a set of legal norms and regulations; but operating within it may be a powerful family, a religious sect, a group of tribal chieftains, or some combination of these. These are elements of the traditional rôle structure operating according to their own traditional norms. The student of these political systems would be greatly misled if he followed Western norms and expectations in describing such a decision-making system. What would be corruption in a Western parliament would be normatively oriented conduct in a "mixed parliament" of the kind often found in the regions outside of the Western-European American area.

Thus such concepts as mixed political culture and mixed political rôle structures may prepare the field researcher more adequately than the accepted political science theory and terminology; for in going to Indonesia or Thailand he will not only have in mind the Western conception of political process and system and a conception of the appropriate rôles of legislatures, bureaucracies, parties, pressure groups, and public opinion, but will rather look for the particular pattern of amalgamation of these rôles with the traditional rôles. His intellectual apparatus would enable him to grapple more quickly and more adequately with political phenomena which he might otherwise overlook, or treat as pathologies.

TOTALITARIAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The totalitarian political culture gives the appearance of being homogeneous, but the homogeneity is synthetic. Since there are no voluntary associations, and political communication is controlled from the center, it is impossible to judge in any accurate way the extent to which there is a positive acceptance of the totalitarian order. One can only say that in view of the thorough-going penetration of the society by a centrally controlled system of organizations and communications, and the special way in which coercion or its threat is applied, the totalitarian system, in contrast to the others, tends to be non-consensual. This is not to say that it is completely non-consensual. A completely coercive political system is unthinkable. But if one were to place the totalitarian system on a continuum of consensual-non-consensual it would be located rather more at the non-consensual end of the continuum than the others described here. Unlike the other systems where some form of legitimacy — whether traditional, rational-legal, or charismatic — underlies the acquiescence of the individual in the political system, in the totalitarian order the characteristic orientation to authority tends to be some combination of conformity and apathy. This type of political system has become possible only in modern times, since it depends on the modern technology of communication, on modern types of organization, and on the modern technology of violence. Historic tyrannies have no doubt sought this kind of dominion but were limited in the effectiveness of their means. Totalitarianism is tyranny with a rational bureaucracy, a monopoly

of the modern technology of communication, and a monopoly of the modern technology of violence.

RÔLE STRUCTURE IN TOTALITARIAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

I believe Franz Neumann in his *Behemoth*⁶ was one of the first students of totalitarianism who rejected the *monocratic* model as being useful in understanding these systems. He spoke of the peculiar shapelessness of the Nazi régime, of the fact that there was no stable delegation of power among the bureaucracy, party, the army, the organizations of big business, and the like. He concluded, as you recall, that there was no state under the Nazis. I believe what he meant to say was that there was no *legitimate* state. Later students of totalitarianism such as Hannah Arendt,⁷ Merle Fainsod,⁸ Carl Friedrich,⁹ Alex Inkeles,¹⁰ and Barrington Moore, Jr.,¹¹ have been led to similar conclusions about totalitarianism in general, or about Soviet totalitarianism. Hannah Arendt has painted the most extreme picture, which, while an exaggeration, is useful analytically. She argues that the "isolation of atomized individuals provides not only the mass basis for totalitarian rule, but is carried through at the very top of the whole structure." The aim of this process of atomization is to destroy solidarity at any point in the system and to avoid all stable delegations of power which might reduce the freedom of manoeuvre of those at the very center of the system. "As techniques of government, the totalitarian devices appear simple and ingeniously effective. They assure not only an absolute power monopoly, but unparalleled certainty that all commands will always be carried out; the multiplicity of the transmission belts, the confusion of the hierarchy, secure the dictator's complete independence of all his inferiors and make possible the swift and surprising

⁶Franz Neumann, *Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*: (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942), pp. 459ff.

⁷Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1951), p. 388.

⁸Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), pp. 354 ff.

⁹Carl J. Friedrich, ed. *Totalitarianism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 47ff.

¹⁰Alex Inkeles in *ibid.*, pp. 88 ff.

¹¹Barrington Moore, Jr., *Terror And Progress USSR: Some Sources of Change and Stability in the Soviet Dictatorship* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 154 ff.

changes in policy for which totalitarianism has become famous.”¹²

There are thus at least two distinctive characteristics of the totalitarian rôle structure: (1) the predominance of the coercive rôles, and (2) the functional instability of the power rôles — bureaucracy, party, army, and secret police. The predominance of the coercive rôle structure is reflected in its penetration of all of the other rôle structures. Thus all forms of organization and communication become saturated with a coercive flavor. This predominance of coercion is reflected in the celebrated definition of the state as “bodies of armed men” in Lenin’s *State and Revolution*. It is also reflected in the doctrine of the “potential enemy of the state,” a conception under which almost any behavior may be arbitrarily defined as disloyal behavior. This eliminates the predictability of the impact of coercion and renders it an omnipresent force, however limited its application may be in a quantitative sense.

The functional instability among the power rôles has as its main purpose the prevention of any stable delegation of power, and the consequent diffusion of power and creation of other power centers. This pattern was apparently quite marked in the development of the Nazi régime and has been observable in the uneasy balance established in the Soviet Union between party, bureaucracy, army, and secret police. In the nature of the case there must be a stabler delegation of power among the economic allocative rôles, but even these rôles are penetrated by the coercive rôle structure and manipulated within limits. A third class of rôles is illustrated by the electoral process and the representative system, as well as the practice of “self-criticism” in the party. While there is a set of norms under which these activities are supposed to influence power and policy-making, they are rather to be understood as mobilizing devices, as devices intended to create a façade of consent.

THE CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

We refer here primarily to France, Germany, and Italy. The Scandinavian and Low Countries stand somewhere in between the Continental pattern and the Anglo-American. What is most marked about the Continental European systems is the fragmentation of

¹²Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 389.

political culture; but this fragmentation is rather different from that of the non-Western systems. For in the non-Western systems we are dealing with mixed political cultures involving the most striking contrasts. The Western political culture arising out of a very different development pattern is introduced bodily, so to speak, from the outside. In the Continental European systems we are dealing with a pattern of political culture characterized by an uneven pattern of development. There are significant survivals, "outcroppings," of older cultures and their political manifestations. But all of the cultural variations have common roots and share a common heritage.

In view of this developmental pattern it may be appropriate to speak of the Continental European systems as having political sub-cultures. There is indeed in all the examples of this type of system a surviving pre-industrial sub-culture (e.g., the Catholic *Ancien Régime* areas in France, Southern Italy, and the Islands, and parts of Bavaria). The historical background of all three of these systems is characterized by a failure on the part of the middle classes in the nineteenth century to carry through a thorough-going secularization of the political culture. Thus another political sub-culture in these political systems constitutes remnants of the older middle classes who are still primarily concerned with the secularization of the political system itself. A third group of political sub-cultures is associated with the modernized and industrialized parts of these societies. But because they emerged in an only partially secularized political culture, their potentialities for "political market" behavior were thwarted. As major political sub-cultures there are thus these three: (1) the pre-industrial, primarily Catholic components, (2) the older middle-class components, and (3) the industrial components proper. But the political culture is more complex than this. Since in the last century the political issues have involved the very survival of these sub-cultures, and the basic form of the political system itself, the political actors have not come to politics with specific bargainable differences but rather with conflicting and mutually exclusive designs for the political culture and political system. This has involved a further fragmentation at the level of ideology and political organizations. Thus the pre-industrial, primarily Catholic element has both an adaptive, semi-secular wing and an anti-secular wing. The middle classes are divided into

conservative wings in uneasy alliance with clerical pre-republican elements, and left-wings in uneasy friendship with socialists. Finally, the industrial workers are divided according to the degree of their alienation from the political system as a whole. The organized political manifestations of this fragmented political culture take the form of "movements" or sects, rather than of political parties. This means that political affiliation is more of an act of faith than of agency.

Perhaps the most pronounced characteristic of the political rôle structure in these areas is what one might call a general alienation from the political market. The political culture pattern is not adapted to the political system. For while these countries have adopted parliaments and popular elections, they are not appropriately oriented to these institutions. The political actors come to the market not to exchange, compromise, and adapt, but to preach, exhort, convert, and transform the political system into something other than a bargaining agency. What bargaining and exchanging does occur tends to take the form of under-the-counter transactions. Thus demoralization ("*transformism*") is an almost inescapable consequence of this combination of political culture and system. In contrast, the normatively consistent, morally confident actor in this type of political system is the *militant* who remains within the confines of his political sub-culture, continually reaffirms his special norms, and scolds his parliamentarians.

This suggests another essential characteristic of this type of rôle structure, which places it in contrast to the Anglo-American. There is not an individuation of the political rôles, but rather the rôles are embedded in the sub-cultures and tend to constitute separate sub-systems of rôles. Thus the Catholic sub-culture has the Church itself, the Catholic schools, propaganda organizations such as Catholic Action, Catholic trade unions, or worker organizations, a Catholic party or parties, and a Catholic press. The Communist sub-culture — the sub-culture of the political "alienates" — similarly has a complete and separate system of rôles. The socialist and "liberal" sub-cultures tend in the same direction but are less fully organized and less exclusive. Thus one would have to say that the center of gravity in these political systems is not in the formal legal rôle structure but in the political sub-cultures. Thus "immobilism" would appear to be a normal property of this

kind of political system, and it is not so much an "immobilism" of formal-legal institutions as a consequence of the condition of the political culture. Needless to say, this portrayal of the Continental European political system has been exaggerated for purposes of contrast and comparison.

Two other general aspects of the rôle structure of these countries call for comment. First, there is a higher degree of substitutability of rôles than in the Anglo-American political systems and a lessor degree than in the non-Western systems. Thus parties may manipulate pressure groups in the sense of making their decisions for them (the Communist case); interest groups such as the Church and Catholic Action may manipulate parties and trade unions; and interest groups may operate directly in the legislative process, although this last pattern occurs in the Anglo-American system as well. The "immobilism" of the formally political organs often leads to a predominance of the bureaucracy in policy-making.

A second general characteristic, which is a consequence of the immobilism of the political system as a whole, is the ever-present threat of what is often called the "Caesaristic" breakthrough. As in the non-Western area, although the situations and causes are different, these systems tend always to be threatened by, and sometimes to be swept away by, movements of charismatic nationalism which break through the boundaries of the political subcultures and overcome immobilism through coercive action and organization. In other words, these systems have a totalitarian potentiality in them. The fragmented political culture may be transformed into a synthetically homogeneous one and the stalemated rôle structure mobilized by the introduction of the coercive pattern already described.

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In conclusion perhaps the point might be made that conceptual and terminological growth in the sciences is as inevitable as the growth of language itself. But just as all the slang and neologisms of the moment do not find a permanent place in the language, so also all of the conceptual jargon which the restless minds of scholars invent — sometimes to facilitate communication with their colleagues and sometimes to confound them — will not find its

permanent place in the vocabulary of the disciplines. The ultimate criterion of admission or rejection is the facilitation of understanding, and this, fortunately enough, is not in the hands of the restless and inventive scholar, but in the hands of the future scholarly generations who will try them out for "fit." If I may be permitted to conclude with a minor note of blasphemy, it may be said of new concepts as it was said of the salvation of souls . . . "there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth, for many are called but few are chosen."